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Dispatcher: "911, what's the addess ofyour emergency?"
Caller- "[Providesaddress There's a woman pushinga shopping
cart infrnt of my house."
Dispatcher. "I'm sorry I'm not getting it. What's the problem?"
Caller: "You need to get out here now."
Dispatcher. "Um. . . . I'm sony, I don't understandwhat you're

"

reporting."
Caller "She's black"
Dispatcher: "Sir I'm still not seeing the problem. Is she being
loud? Is the noise of the cartdisturbingyourpeace?"
Caller- "Where do you live?"
Dispatcher. "Oakland
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Caller: "You wouldn't understand then. This isn't Oakland We
don't have people like her in this neighborhood Just sendsomeone out
to get ridofher I'm not talking to you anymore." [Click]'
"The worst thing about it? I had to send someone out." 2

I.

INTRODUCTION
Fear and ignorance lie at the heart of prejudice.? Irrational fear,

particularly of people of color, has shaped the American criminal
justice system since the nation's colonial beginnings. For nearly 350
years, from the arrival of the first slave ships to Virginia in 1619 to the

passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, de jure segregation in
America created a caste system based on race.4

Many of the

propagators of this apartheid trafficked in. racist fear-mongering to
justify discriminatory treatment of African Americans, warning white
America about the inherent criminality and violent propensities of

black men.'
1.
Rachael Herron, I Used to Be a 911 Dispatcher. I Hadto Respond to Racist Calls
Every Day, Vox, https://www.vox.com/first-person/2018/5/30/17406092/racial-profiling911-bbq-becky-living-while-black-babysitting-while-black (last updated Oct. 31, 2018)
(emphasis omitted) (recalling a call from an "affluent and very white" neighborhood in
northem California).
2.
Id ("Dispatchers usually don't get to choose which calls lead to the dispatching of
emergency personnel and which don't If a person wants to make a report, they get to make a
report. You can think of police reports as being like lawsuits. Anyone can make one about
anything, no matter how stupid").
3.
See Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 951 F. Supp. 1039,1054 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
("What motive is there ever for prejudice and bigotry? There is no motive for it It stems from
hate, from ignorance, maybe from fear."); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21 (NJ.
1997) (urging knowledge as an antidote to "the kind of ignorance that nourishes ... hysteria
and irrational fear . .. which, in turn, perpetuate . .. prejudice and discrimination"); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016,1027 (1988)
(' am convinced that unconscious racism is ignored ... for three reasons, all linked to the
nature of phenomenon itself: ignorance, fear, and denial.").
4.

CHARiES E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHrrE 21-25 (1964); see also

Stacey Patton & Anthony Paul Farley, There'sNo Cost to Wite People Who Call 911 About
Black People. There ShouldBe., WASH POST (May 16,2018), https://www.washingtonpost
comnnews/posteverything/wp/2018/05/16/theres-no-cost-to-white-people-who-cal-91 1-aboutblack-people-there-should-be/? ("Blackness was a crime, a conviction and a life sentence for
most of our history. From 1619 to the late 1960s, blackness was as much an endless subjection
to humiliating and impoverishing legal controls as it was a color.").
Fran Lisa Buntman, Race, Reputation, and the Supreme Court: Valuing Blackness
5.
and Whiteness, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) ("In the United States, being black ... has
long been seen as a sign of criminality, or at least criminal propensity."). See generally Paul
Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063 (1993) (tracing the history of
"blackness" as synonymous with crime to early court decisions justifying slavery because of
the inherent criminality of black men).

934

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 93:931

This myth of the "black bogeyman" has endured for centuries
and taken many forms-from the "rebellious Negro," to the "[b]lack
brute" rapist,' to the "super-predator." 9 These racist tropes of a black
criminal subclass are now so ingrained in the fabric of American
society that science long ago confirmed the existence of a pervasive,
unconscious, and largely automatic bias against dark-skinned
individuals as more hostile, criminal, and prone to violence.o These
biases infect nearly everyone."
6.

Laura T. Fishman, The BlackBogeyman and White Self-Righteousness, in IMAGES

oF COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIMnE 177 (Coramae Richey Mann & Marjorie S. Zatz eds., 2d ed.

2002).
7.
See Bryan Adamson, "Thugs, " "Crooks, "and "Rebellious Negroes ": Racist and
RacializedMedia Coverage ofMichael Brown and the FergusonDemonstrations,32 HARV.
J. RACIAL & ETmNIc JuST. 189, 226 (2016) (connecting the centuries-old "rebellious Negro
trope" to current coverage of unarmed black men killed by police officers).
8.
See Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review ofRacist Summations: Redeeming the
Promise ofSearchingAnalysis, 11 MICiH. J. RACE & L. 325, 346 (2006) ("[The stereotype of
the Black brute ... has been proven to be one of the most enduring and powerful stereotypes
in the nation's history."); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching; Federalism,and the Intersection
ofRace and Genderin the ProgressiveEra, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 59 (1996) (recalling
how the "Southern myth of the 'black-beast' rapist justified lynching" in the postReconstruction South); R.A. Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mat Race, Stigma, and Equality
in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 859 (2004) (describing the stereotype of "the black beast,
a violent brute with an unusually powerful sexual appetite for white women who was
completely devoid of humanity"); see also State v. Washington, 67 So. 930, 931 (La. 1915)
(quoting a prosecutor addressing the jury in the trial of a black man accused of raping a white
woman in Louisiana as saying, "Gentlemen, do you believe that she would have had
intercourse with this black brute? ... [H]e is a beast and a brute of the lower beastly kind.").
See Robert J. Smith & Zoe Robinson, ConstitutionalLiberty and the Progression
9.
of Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 413, 425 (2017) (tracing the genesis of the "superpredator" myth to a warning by Professor John Dilulio of "a coming 'breed' of juvenile
offenders" who are "fatheriess, Godless, and jobless" and who "kill, rape, maim, without
giving it a second thought" (first quoting John J. Dilulio Jr., ArrestingIdeas, HOOVER INST.
POL'YREV. (Sept. 1, 1995), https-//www.hoover.org/research/arresting-ideas; and then quoting
Editorial, Echoes ofthe Superpredator,N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), https-//www.nytimes.con/
2014/04/14/opinion/echoes-of-the-sepredatorhtml)); Watch Hiaiy Clinton's Controversial
1996 'Super-Predators'Comment, WASH. PosT., https-//www.washingtonpost.com/video/
politics/watch-hilary-clintons-controversial-1996-super-predators-comment/2016/02/26ld0d
cce4-dc88-1 1e5-8210-fDbd8de9l5f6_video.html? (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
10. Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, RacialAnxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235,
2238-45 (2017) (connecting implicit racial bias to systemic "racial anxiety" in interracial
interactions); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Gofl Implicit Racial Bias in Public
Defender Thiage, 122 YALE LJ. 2626, 2629-31 (2013) (summarizing the science of implicit
bias and the widely held implicit stereotype of "blacks as violent, hostile, aggressive, and
dangerous").
11. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A BehavioralRealistRevision
of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2006) (defining implicit bias as
"pervasive but diffuse, consequential but unintended, ubiquitous but invisible"); L. Song
Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 ND. LJ. 1143, 1169 (2012)
("[Ijmplicit biases are ubiquitous, [but] they are also malleable").
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Scholars have written passionately and convincingly about the
ways in which these long-held explicit and implicit racial biases corrupt
official actors within the criminal justice system-the legislators,
police officers, prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and juries.12 This
Article explores the impact of racial fear on a critical but littleexamined "unofficial" actor in the criminal justice system: the civilian
complainant.13 In particular, it considers how bias-motivated civilians
weaponize law enforcement to respond to their irrational racial fears
through misuse and abuse of 911 and other emergency response
systems.
In doing so, this Article contributes to the existing literature by
examining (1) why this particular form of "weaponized racial fear" is
occurring with increasing frequency, (2) what impacts police response
to frivolous complaints have on the individuals and communities most
targeted, (3) how legislatures and courts acquiesce to such behavior,
and (4) how modest changes to existing law and police department
policies can limit the impact of this weaponization.
This discussion is overdue for several reasons. First, local 911
call centers across the country receive an overwhelming number of
frivolous or accidental "nonemergency" 911 calls.14 Yet, most police
departments require officers to respond to all but the most patently
unnecessary calls." Second, in a pluralistic, integrated society where

12. See, e.g., Yvonne Elosiebo,ImplicitBias andEqual Protection:A ParadigmShift
42 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451, 486 (2018) ("If the harms of implicit bias manifest in
our daily interactions, nothing prevents them from manifesting in a legislator's office, in police
interactions, in the prosecutor's office, or in the courtroom."); M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias,
83 Mo. L. REv. 301, 335-39 (2018) (implicit bias and police officers); Richardson & Goff
supra note 10, at 2629-42 (implicit bias and public defenders); Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the
Jy: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit JurorBias, 44 CONN. L. REv. 827, 833 (2012)
(implicit bias and juries); L. Song Richardson, Systemic riage:Implicit RacialBias in the
Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE LJ. 862, 875 (2017) (book review) (implicit bias and
prosecutors).
13. Throughout this Article, the term "civilian" refers to anyone who is not a police
officer or member of law enforcement generally. It is intended to denote the dividing line
between the individuals making police reports and the police officers responding to them. The
term does not have any military connotations, nor is it used in the way members of the armed
forces typically refer to "civilians."
14. See Christina M. Eastman, Chapter 89: Rescuing 911?, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV.
486,489-92 (2009); Rana Sampson, Misuse andAbuse of911: Guide No. 19 (2002), ARIz. ST.
U. CrIR. FOR PRoBLEM-ORIENTED PoucING, http://www.popcenter.org/problems/911 abuse/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
15. Police Take DifferentApproachesto 'The TYranny of911,' NPR (June 28, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/06/28/196588465/police-take-different-approaches-to-the-tyrannyof-911; see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
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African Americans occupy physical, professional, and hierarchical
spaces once legally or traditionally reserved for Caucasians, fearful
white Americans increasingly interpret innocent conduct by black
Americans in "their space" as suspicious behavior requiring a response
from an armed officer.16 Third, acting on these racial fears results in far
more than frivolous phone calls and a waste of taxpayer money. As the
killings of Michael Brown, Stephon Clark, and dozens of other
unarmed black men and boys at the hands of police officers has made
clear,17 what may begin as a vague complaint about a "suspicious black
male" too often ends in unnecessary violent confrontation. The
consequences of weaponized racial fear are simply too great to ignore.
At its core, this Article challenges the popular notion that
improving the quality of police interactions with people of color can
sufficiently lessen this epidemic of racial fear. While community
policing efforts and implicit bias awareness training are laudable, they
represent a drop of water in the ocean of explicit and unconscious racial
bias permeating all aspects of society. Instead, recognizing the sheer
number of unnecessary police contacts initiated by frivolous 911 calls
and the role pervasive racial fear plays in many of these civilian
complaints, this Article advocates for a reduction in the quantity of
police contacts with people of color by suggesting legislative reforms
designed to inject much-needed discretion into the emergency response
system and to provide enforceable deterrence mechanisms against
racially motivated calls.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II traces the history of
racial fear in America, highlighting racist fear-mongering efforts to
instill a permanent suspicion of the "unidentified black male."" In this
Part, I discuss what I call the emerging "fourth wave ofAmerican racial
fear," defined by fear of African Americans coexisting in public "white
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 329 (1998) ("[Mlore effective policing require[s]
anticipating and interrupting the causes of disorder--not just reacting decisively to it").
16. Elijah Anderson, "The White Space," 1 Soc. RACE & ETHNIcrrY 10, 15 (2015)
(describing white backlash to America's "major racial incorporation process, during which
large numbers of black people have made their way from urban ghettos into many settings
previously occupied only by whites").
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Thscript ofKeynote Speech, 54 IDAHo L. REv. 287, 287
(2018) ("Stephon Clark, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott-all
of these individuals share something in common. They all were African-American men who
were unarmed, who were killed by police officers.").
18. See Katheryn K Russell, The RacialHoar as Crime: The Law as Affimation, 71
INo. L.J. 593, 596-600 (1996) (describing the history of criminals diverting attention from their
own misdeeds by preying on negative racial stereotypes and blaming crime on anonymous
black men).
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spaces." The first three waves of racial fear-tracking roughly the eras
of slavery, Jim Crow, and early mass incarceration-were each defined
by the formal legal expression of fear through de jure or de facto
discriminatory criminal treatment. In contrast, the fourth wave of racial
fear reflects a growing uneasiness by white Americans of black
Americans thriving outside of their "iconic ghettos" and in all sectors
of society." Fearful of this change and lacking a formal segregationist
mechanism to validate their fear, these individuals consciously or
unconsciously see criminal suspicion in innocent conduct and call upon
the state to restore the status quo. 20

Part HI examines the fact that many of these fears reflect deeply
ingrained, implicit racial biases held by both civilians and police.
Rather than merely repeat the important scholarship on the science of
implicit bias, this Part highlights the growing evidence that implicit
bias awareness and retraining programs do little to improve either
individual or institutional biases.2 1 It also articulates an oftenoverlooked limitation on bias retraining efforts in the criminal justice
system. These efforts only focus on institutional bias from official
actors such as police officers, judges, and prosecutors but do not and
cannot systematically retrain the biased brains of civilians who
irrationally feel threatened in their daily lives. Retraining programs
also cannot penetrate the phenomenon of confirmation bias, wherein
apprehensive people of color, anticipating discrimination, may respond
19.

See Elijah Anderson, This Is What It Feels Like to Be Black in White Spaces,

GUARDIAN (June 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/09/every

day-racism-america-black-white-spaces.
20. Elijah Anderson, BlackAmericans Are Asserting Their Rights in "White Spaces."
That's When Whites Call911., Vox (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/
8/10/17672412/91 1-police-black-white-mcism-sociology ("When black people do appear in
such places, white people subconsciously or explicitly want to banish them ... to the
stereotypical space in which they think all black people belong, a segregated space for secondclass citizens.').
21. See Olivia Goldhill, The WorldIs Relying on a FlawedPsychologicalTest to Fight
Racism, QuARTz (Dec. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/l 144504/the-world-is-relying-on-a-flawedpsychological-test-to-flght-racism/ ("There are now thousands of workplace talks and police
trainings and jury guidelines that focus on implicit bias, but we still have no strong scientific
proof that these programs work."); Katie Herzog, Is Starbucks InplementingFlawed Science
in Their Anti-Bias Taining?, STRANGER (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/
2018/04/17/26052277/is-starbucks-implementing-flawed-science-in-their-anti-bias-training
(quoting a co-developer of the Implicit Association Test as stating that implicit bias training
"has not been shown to be effective, and it can even be counterproductive"); Jessica Nordell,
Is This How DiscriminationEnds?, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
science/archive/2017/05/unconscious-bias-training/525405/ (explaining that multiple
psychologists responsible for developing implicit bias tests have argued that "workshops
geared toward eliminating people's hidden prejudices ... don't work").
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unconsciously to interracial or police interactions uncooperatively or
with hostility.' This Part thus serves to illustrate the permanence and
pervasiveness of racial fear across all societal strata.
The history, violence, permanence, and unconscious
pervasiveness of racial fear within the criminal justice system confirms
that all encounters with law enforcement are fraught with racial
iniquity, despite the best intentions of individual officers or precincts.
This phenomenon should urge lawmakers and police departments to
minimize unnecessary adversarial contact with communities of color,
at least the contacts initiated by a threadbare civilian accusation of
criminality. But that has not been the case.
Part IV demonstrates that civilians possess broad license to
weaponize racial fear by summoning police officers to respond to any
and every bias-motivated 911 call, regardless of how frivolous or
patently racist. This Part begins by highlighting the crippling epidemic
of misuse of emergency response systems in general and the inefficient
requirement in most departments that dispatchers send officers to all
but the most egregious "nonemergency" calls." It then focuses on
racially biased calls, providing a thirty-day snapshot of weaponized
racial fear in action. The Part concludes with an exploration of the
devastating impacts of police response to bias-motivated calls,
including the erosion of trust between police and vulnerable
communities, and the psychological, legal, and physical effects of these
encounters to the wrongfully accused individuals.
Part V turns to the "weapon" in the weaponization of racial fear:
the armed police officer. In particular, this Part examines how the state
acquiesces to being weaponized by civilian racial fear. While most
police officers are required to respond to every frivolous criminal
complaint, they remain largely immune from any sanction if they
respond to a clearly frivolous encounter with unnecessary or even lethal
force. Requiring armed officers to respond to all racially motivated
calls but allowing them to act with impunity in their responses creates
a dangerous "weapon" for use by prejudiced civilians.
22. See, e.g., Simon Stem, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and
Admnistrative Decisionmaking,82 NOTE DAME L. REv. 1085, 1121 (2007) ("Identity-based
prejudices, particularly racial bias, often trigger confirmation bias .... "); cf L. Song
Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goft InterrogatingRacial Violence, 12 OmO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115,
124 (2014) ("Stereotype threat is not a self-fulfilling prophecy. Rather, it arises in those who
care highly about the domain in which they believe they are being evaluated; simply being
aware of the stereotype is often sufficient to provoke it").
23. See sources cited supranotes 14-15; discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
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This Part also explores the role of courts in fostering this
epidemic. Lower courts throughout the country, following the
intimations of the United States Supreme Court, have lowered the
Graham v. Connor2 4 "objective reasonableness" standard for use of
force cases to such a degree that all but the most patently egregious
violent conduct will be protected. And even ifa judge or jury finds the
officer acted unreasonably, the doctrine of qualified immunity has
"metastasized into an almost absolute defense" for police officers.25
Judges and juries also routinely give officer testimony greater weight
than civilian testimony in misconduct cases, despite widespread
evidence of "testilying" by officers to manufacture details in hindsight
making their conduct appear more reasonable.26
Part VI offers recommendations, including model legislation to
address and deter racially motivated 911 calls. In doing so, this Part
borrows from the uneven experience of legislatures attempting to deter
frivolous lawsuits known as strategic lawsuits against public
participation (SLAPP).27 These suits abuse and weaponize the court
system by allowing plaintiffs to bring frivolous claims for the sole
purpose of intimidating defendants and silencing their public criticism
of plaintiffs.
A majority of states have passed "anti-SLAPP"
legislation, but these laws have drawn sharp criticism for restricting the
fundamental right to access to the courts.29

&

24. 490 U.S. 386,388 (1989).
25. See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 118 (2009)
(asserting that modification to the application of the qualified immunity doctrine "may give
some relief to courts attempting to apply the .. . defense, but it does not address fidamental
problems at the heart of the qualified immunity doctrine," which "can only be made by
examining the defense's basic underlying principles"); cf Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole,
The UnqualfiedParadoxesofQuaifiedImmunity: ReasonablyMstaken Beliefs, Reasonably
Unrwasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective Intent That Haunts Objective Legal
Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1998) (asserting that the doctrine of
qualified immunity was intended to provide broad immunity for government officials, even
when they "violate[] a clearly established constitutional right," where the official "mistaken[y]
belie[ves] that his conduct does not violate a clearly established right (emphasis omitted)).
26. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. LJ. 835, 835-37
(2008).
27. See Aaron Smith, Note, SIAPPFight, 68 ALA. L. REV. 303, 305 (2016).
28. Jerome I. Braun, IncreasingSLAPPProtection:Unburdeningthe Right ofPetition
in Calfornia, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969-72 (1999); see also GEORGE W. PRING
PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GErING SUED FOR SPEAING Our, at xi, 3 (1996) (estimating that
thousands of participants in public discourse have been silenced by frivolous SLAPP suits).
29. See Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 869 (Wash. 2015); Carol Rice Andrews, Motive
Restrictionson CourtAccess: A FirstAmendment Challenge, 61 OHO ST. L.J. 665, 666, 66980, 722-23 (2000) (detailing the history of the fundamental right of access to the courts and
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The "anti-SLAPP" experience provides an instructive parallel to
the weaponized racial bias context. Bias-motivated individuals abuse
and weaponize law enforcement resources by making frivolous
complaints for the purpose of intimidating an innocent person of color
or having him arrested.30 But much like current anti-SLAPP
legislation, calls by some legislators and activists to criminally punish
all nonemergency 911 calls or make all bias-motivated calls a hate
crime 1 would almost certainly deter people from accessing critical
lifesaving services for true emergencies. With these competing
considerations in mind, the Part provides a model statute giving greater
discretion to dispatchers and police officers to ignore frivolous calls on
the front end, providing for stiffer penalties for all such clearly frivolous
calls, and providing greater access to civil remedies for wrongfully
targeted individuals on the back end. The Part concludes with a
discussion of anticipated criticisms of this approach.
II.

THE FOURTH WAVE OF AMERICAN RACIAL FEAR

To understand the current state of weaponized racial fear in this
country, a brief consideration of the historical development of racebased fear is instructive. This Part traces the violent origins and
evolution of this nation's irrational fear of a criminal racial subclass
through four historical "waves" of racial fear.
A.

Slavery and the Violence ofRacial Fear

For most of this nation's history, race relations were defined by
de jure segregation built on violence against and fear of people of
color.32 From 1619 to 1865, southern American society and the
American economy depended on chattel slavery, a labor system

criticizing anti-SLAPP laws that "potentially penalize plaintiffs for having improper motives
in bringing a civil suit").
30. Carl Takei, How Police Can Stop Being Weaponized by Bias-Motivated9l Calls,
ACLU (June 18, 2018), https*//www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justicerace-and-criminal-justicel
how-police-ca-stop-being-weaponized-bias-motivated.
31. See Chris Riotta, New YorkLegislatorProposesHate CrimeBillfor DubiousCalls
to Police Against Black People After It Happens to Him, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.independentco.uk/newsworld/americas/hate-crime-black-jesse-hamilton-newyork-police-called-black-people-a8501801.htmL
32. Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE U. 256, 271 (2005) (discussing the history of dejure segregation
prior to 1954).
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defined by violence and forced subjugation." As with any systemic
forced oppression, the architects of this brutal system remained fearful
of rebellions. 3 4 "W tes ven those who never owned a slave-lived
with the fear that [the existing] racial order might be turned upside
down" by insurrection." This 250-year history of violence and
apprehension created a foundation of racial fear from which this
country has never escaped.
The irrational racial fear created by America's "original sin"3 6 is
indelibly woven into the fabric of contemporary American policing. In
fact, modern-day municipal policing in the United States evolved
initially from "slave patrols" created in South Carolina and other
southern states in the eighteenth century to quell rebellions and instill
fear in slave populations." These slave patrols were "known for their
brutality and ruthlessness" and continued to exist in unofficial forms
long after abolition." These unofficial incarnations-most notably
lynch mobs and the Ku Klux Klan-reinforced the fear white
Americans were expected to have of "rebellious" black Americans and
carried that fear well into the twentieth century. 9
B.

Jim Cmw and the "BlackBogeyman"

After the Civil War, white supremacists sought to enforce racial
superiority through dejure segregation, Jim Crow laws, and symbolic
33. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the
history of chattel slavery and accompanying violence in the United States); see also Stephen
Kantrowitz, America's Long History of Racial Fear, WE'RE HIST. (June 24, 2015), http:l
werehistory.org/racial-fear/ (connecting the violence of slavery to contemporary racially
fearful violence).
34. Kantrowitz, supra note 33 ("In other words, whites attributed to blacks the same
desire for domination that they themselves were exercising.' ); see also Nelson, 277 F.3d at 190
C'Mhere exist indubitable connections ... between slavery and private violence directed
against despised and enslaved groups and . .. between post Civil War efforts to return freed
slaves to a subjugated status . . . .").
35. Kantrowitz, supranote 33.
36. See JIM WALLIS, AMERICA'S ORIGINAL SIN: RACISM, WHTTE PRIVILEGE, AND THE
BRIDGE TOANEWAMERICA 18 (2016); Annette Gordon-Reed, America's OriginalSin:Slavery
andthe Legacy of White Supremacy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2018.
37.
Hannah LF Cooper, War on Drugs PolicingandPolice Brutality, 50 SUBSTANCE
USE & MISUSE 1188, 1190 (2015) ("Slave patrols were the first state-sponsored police forces.
These patrols consisted of White property-owning men who were charged with preventing
slave uprisings and escapes." (citations omitted)).
38. Danyelle Solomon, The Intersection ofPolicing and Race, CTR. AM. PROGRESS
(Sept 1, 2016), httpsJ//www.americanprogress.org/issuesrace/rports/2016/09/01/143357/theintersection-of-policing-and-race/.
39. See KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA
77-81 (South End Press rev. ed. 2007); Solomon, supra note 38.
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domestic terrorism. As with slavery subordination efforts, the
"struggle"" of white supremacists to maintain formal dominance
required significant effort. Part of that effort involved sowing intense
fear of newly freed African Americans as violent criminals to justify
racist official actions and reinforce the nation's caste system. 41
One of the great victories of white supremacy in this era was the
propagation of the false claim that whites faced an "epidemic of black
men raping white women."42 Despite overwhelming evidence that no
such threat existed, 43 the fantasy that predatory black men routinely
victimized white women became the justification for lynching."
During a 1921 debate over a federal anti-lynching bill on the floor of
the United States House of Representatives, Representative James
Buchanan of Texas denounced "the damnable doctrine of social
equality which excites the criminal sensualities of the criminal element
of the Negro race and directly incites the diabolical crime of rape upon
white women. Lynching follows -as swift as lightning, and all the
statutes of State and Nation can not stop it."' Representative Thomas
Upton Sisson of Mississippi agreed, asserting that white southern men
"are going to protect our girls and womenfolk from these black brutes.
When these black fiends keep their hands off the throats of the women
of the South then lynching will stop."4 6
This myth of the "black bogeyman," a violent and crazed sexual
criminal, endures. Ten years after the abominable statements of
Representatives Buchanan and Sisson, nine African-American
teenagers were wrongfully accused and convicted of raping two white
women on a train. 7 The "Scottsboro Boys" were convicted on three
separate occasions in rushed and procedurally improper trials held in
48
Scottsboro, Alabama, with all but one being sentenced to death.
40. Kantrowitz, supra note 33 ("The Reconstruction years thus gave way to another
history: the continuing struggle by white supremacist activists to create and enforce Jim Crow's
exclusion, segregation, and lynching.").
41. Id; see sources cited supranotes 5-7.
42. Kantrowitz, supranote 33.
43. Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Politic
in the Reconstruction South, 100 Mica. L. REV. 675, 697 (2002); Joshua D. Rothman, The
Charleston Massacre and the Rape Myth of Reconstruction, WE'RE HIsT. (June 22, 2015),
http-//werehistory.org/charleston-rape-myth/.
See sources cited supra notes 5-8.
44.
62 CONG. REc. 451, 468 (1921) (statement of Rep. Buchanan).
45.
62 CONG. REC. 1669, 1721 (1922) (statement of Rep. Sisson).
46.
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial rigins ofModern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH.
47.
L. REV. 48, 61-72 (2000).
48.
Id
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During the civil rights movement, white supremacists argued that
segregation was necessary to keep black predators from raping white
women and leading to the "mongrelization" of the white race.49 And
on June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered an African-American church in
Charleston, South Carolina, and reportedly exclaimed to the prayer
group inside, "You rape our women and you're taking over our
country."5 0 He then opened fire and killed nine people.51
The enduring nature of this false and pernicious racist trope helps
explain the phenomenon of "racial hoaxes."52 Coined by Kathryn
Russell-Brown, the term "racial hoaxes" refers to false accusations of
an unknown "black male" engaging in crime to direct attention away
from the accuser's own misdeeds." Russell-Brown identified at least
seven such hoaxes between 1987 and 1996.54 Similar hoaxes continue
to make national news. In recent years, white accusers have invoked
the "violent black man" to cover up school truancy," embezzlement of
funds from an employer,5 6 accidentally shooting themselves,"
accidentally shooting a girlfriend," self-mutilation, politically
49. See Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career ofJane Crow: Ser Segregationand the
Tansformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187, 193-94

(2006) ("Popular segregationist screeds like Judge Tom P. Brady's Black Monday:
Segregation or Amalgamation, America Has Its Choice and Senator Theodore Bilbo's Take
Your Choice:SeparationorMongrelizationminced no words in forecasting racial integration's

ultimate result-intermarriage culminating in the irreversible decline of civilization.").
50. Kantrowitz, supra note 33.
51.

Dylann RoofSentenced to Deathfor the Murders oflne Black ChurchMembers,

(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/10/dylann-roofsentenced-to-leath-charleston-church-shooting.
52. See Russell, supranote 18, at 600.
53. Id
GuARIAN

54. Id at 596-600.
55. wills Robinson, Two White Boys Who Told Police a Kmfe-Fielding Black Man
Triedto Abduct Them Made Up Story Because They Wanted to Skip School, DAILY MAIL (Apr.

25, 2016), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3558104/Two-white-boys-told-policeknife-wielding-black-man-tried-abduct-story-waned-skip-school.htmL
56. Nsenga K. Burton, White Women and 'Blame a BlackMan'Syndrome,ROOT (Feb.
1, 2012), https*//www.therootcom/white-women-and-blame-a-black-man-syndrome-179088
9717.
57.

Taryn Finley, A Man Accidentally Shot Himselfand Blamed an ImaginaryBlack

Man, HUFFINGTON Posr (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpostcom/entry/man-shothimself-blamed-imaginary-black-manus58cfebaee4b0be71df64063.
58. Gareth Davies, Man Awaiting Double Rape THal Shoots His Own Girlfiendbut
Tells Police It Was a Random Black Man Who Pulled the Trigger, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 13,

2017), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4879382/Man-awaiting-double-rape-trialshoots-girlfiend.htnil.
59. Abbie Boudreau et al.,AcidAttackHoarerBethanyStorro Says She Was Siffering
from Mental Illness-Exclusive, ABC NEws (Feb. 18, 2013), https*//abcnews.go.com/blogs/
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motivated mutilation," murdering their children, 61 and killing their
pregnant spouse. 62 These racial hoaxes work in large part because of
the enduring belief in the myth of the "black bogeyman," a myth that
continues to be reinforced through negative media imagery that
demonizes and stereotypes black men.6 3
C

Mass Incarcerationand "Super-Predators"

Although the 1968 Fair Housing Act eliminated the last vestige of
de jure racial segregation in the United States, that same year
presidential candidate Richard Nixon swept into office on a racebaiting platform of "law and order" that characterized African
Americans as dangerous drug users requiring stiffer criminal
penalties.65 Although President Nixon would not declare drug abuse to
be "public enemy number one" until 1971, ushering in the unofficial
"war on drugs," 6 6 Nixon's campaign advisor John Ehrlichman later
acknowledged that:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had
two enemies: the antiwar left and black people.

...

We knew we couldn't

make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the
headlines/2013/02/acid-attack-hoaxer-bethany-storro-says-she-was-suffering-from-mentalillness-exclusive/.
60.
Young Republican Who ClaimedObamaSupporterCarvedLetter 'B'onHerFace
DuringRobbery Made the Story Up, Police Say, DAILY MAIL (Oct 27, 2008), https//www.
dailymaiLco.uk/news/article-1080189/Young-Republican-claimed-Obama-supporter-carvedletter-B-face-robbery-story-police-say.htmL
61. Elizabeth Chuck, Susan Smith, Mother Who Killed Kids: 'Something Went Very
Wrong That Night,' NBC NEWS (July 23, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
susan-smith-mother-who-killed-kids-something-went-very-wrong-n39705 1.
62. Danielle Young, White Lies: A BriefHistoryof White PeopleLying About Crimes,
Roor (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.theroot.com/white-lies-a-brief-history-of-white-peoplelying-about-1790856437 (describing the case of Charles Stuart, who alleged "that his wife,
Carol DiMaiti, and unborn child were shot and killed by a black man," which led to an arrest
of African-American William Bennett, before Stuart's brother confessed that Stuart had
committed the crimes "to collect life insurance").
63. See Russell, supra note 18, at 600 n.43 (discussing the creation of the "black
bogeyman" myth and its impacts).
64. Rogers M. Smith, Ackerman's Civil Rights Revolution and Modem American
RacialPolitics, 123 YALE L.J. 2906,2920 (2014).
65. TAU MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLCIT MESSAGES,
AND THE NoRM OF EQUALITY 97 (2001) ("Law and order for Nixon boiled down to the 'damn
Negroes,' but he could not say this in his [campaign] ad... He intended to convey racial
meaning implicitly. He wanted to appeal to racial stereotypes, fears, and resentments, yet
conform to the norm of racial equality.").
66.
Thirty Years ofAmerica'sDrug War: A Chronology,PBS FRONTUINE, http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
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public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin,
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.
We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings,
and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we
were lying about the drugs? Of course we did."

Throughout
orchestrated

the

public

Nixon . presidency,
drug

raids

almost

the

Administration

exclusively

targeting

communities of color, buttressing both Nixon's self-cultivated
"watchdog" reputation and the "black bogeyman" myth, this time in
the form of a drug-crazed, violent inner-city criminal."
But the most severe effects of the war on drugs were not felt until
the Reagan Administration pursued draconian legislation targeting
communities of color with shockingly disparate sentencing treatment.

In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which
established twenty-nine new mandatory minimum sentences for drug

offenses, including minor drug use and possession offenses."9 Around
the same time, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also created a 100-to1 sentencing disparity for the trafficking or possession of crack cocaine
compared to penalties for trafficking or possession of powder
cocaine. 70
This disparity had racist origins, targeting African Americans who
were more likely to traffic and use cheaper crack cocaine than white
Americans who were more likely to traffic and use more expensive
powder cocaine." As with Nixon, President Reagan sought approval

for his disparate sentencing measures by deliberately misleading the
public about the allegedly more potent, harmful, and addictive qualities

67. Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Wmn the War on Drugs, HARPER'S MAG., Apr.
2016, at 22.
68. See Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 227,246-48 (2015)
(describing Nixon's racially charged declaration of the war on drugs).
69.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
70. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012)); see also Dorsey v. United States,
567 U.S. 260,266 (2012) (discussing the sentencing disparity created by the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act).
71. Baradaran, supra note 68, at 247-48; see also Naomi Murakawa, The Racial
Antecedents to FederalSentencing Guidelines:How CongressJudgedthe Judgesfrom Brown
to Booker, 11 ROGER WIUAhs U. L. REV. 473, 480 (2006) (discussing how the end of Jim
Crow laws and ensuing racial discontent in Congress drove sentencing reform in the 1980s).
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of crack cocaine." The "black bogeyman" myth was reborn in the form
of "crack whores" and "crack babies" hollowing out American cities
and "welfare queens" bilking honest taxpayers to feed their
addictions." In 1986, 77me magazine declared "crack" the issue of the
year.74 The 100-to-1 mandatory minimum sentencing disparities
became law later that year.5
The black criminal underclass trope was peddled by both
The Clinton
Republican and Democratic administrations.
Administration doubled down on the war on drugs with its own harsh,
disparate sentencing policies. In 1996, then-First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton defended "zero tolerance" and "three strikes" policies,
claiming that an entire generation of "super-predator" children, bom
without conscience or empathy, needed to be brought "to heel.""
Mandatory minimum sentences and disparate sentencing
treatment for drug offenses predominantly committed by African
Americans sparked an explosion in the U.S. prison population.77 In
1974, the state and federal prison population stood at 218,466." By
2014, that total had risen to 1,508,636, a nearly 600% increase." The
state and federal prison population nearly tripled in the twelve years
immediately following passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act." Today,
imprisonment for drug offenses has grown over 1000% since 1974,
with the disproportionate brunt of this mass incarceration epidemic
being borne by communities of color."
72. Baradaran, supra note 68, at 231; see also Baum, supranote 67 (quoting a former
Nixon Administration official on the goals of distinguishing crack from powder cocainenamely to disrupt black communities).
73. Kathleen R. Sandy, The DiscrkninationInherent in America'sDrug War: Hidden
Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria over Crack, 54 ALA. L. REV. 665, 683-85 (2003).
Jacob V. Lamar, Jr. et al., "Crack": A Cheap and Deadly Cocaine Is a Fast74.
SpreadingMenace, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 16.
75.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit I, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012)).
76. See sources cited supra note 9.
77. Lauren Carroll, How the War on DrugsAffectedIncarcerationRates, POLrIFACr
(July 10, 2016), https*//www.politifact.comtruth-o-meter/statements/2016jul/10/cory-booker/
how-war-drugs-affected-incarceration-rates/.
78. Id
79. Id
Criminal Justice Facts, SENr'G PROJEcr, http-//www.sentencingproject.org/
80.
criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
81. See Carroll,supranote 78 ("58 percent of all sentenced inmates in 2013 were black
or hispanic, yet the two groups make up just about 30 percent of the [United States]
population."). Further confirming the disparate impact on communities of color, a 2014 study
concluded that "black people are 3.6 times more likely than white people to be arrested for
selling drugs and 2.5 times more for drug possession." Id
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The effects of this "new Jim Crow"82 regime are far-reaching and
catastrophic. "The War on Drugs foreseeably and unnecessarily
blighted the lives of hundreds of thousands of young, disadvantaged
[black] Americans ... and undermined decades of effort to improve the
life chances of members of the urban black underclass.' 3
It
perpetuated institutional poverty by removing significant portions of
the population from the workforce by labeling millions of black men
and women with the scarlet letter of a felony drug conviction, making
them all but unemployable." Psychologically, the fact that black and
brown Americans compose nearly three-fifths of the U.S. prison
population reinforces the unfounded, irrational fear that people of color
are predisposed to crime."
D.

"Iconic Ghettos" and "White Spaces"

It is within this context that the "fourth wave" of racial fear takes
hold. An entire generation of white Americans have come to expect a
certain "ghettoization" of African Americans, portrayed in the news
media and entertainment outlets as poor, urban, and prone to drug use
or other criminal activity." When people of color fail to fulfill that
stereotype, whether by shopping at an upscale clothing store,"
attending a prestigious university," or walking through a neighborhood
that "isn't Oakland,"8 9 deeply ingrained and automatic apprehensions
of the "black bogeyman" once again rise to the surface.

82.
See generallyMICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBUNDNESS (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing the function of modem-day mass

incarceration as a substitute for Jim Crow laws).
83.
Michael Tonry, Race andthe War on Drugs, 1994 U. CI. LEGAL F. 25,27.
84. CriminalJustice Facts, supranote 80.
85. See Tasha Hill, Inmates' Need for Federally FundedLawyers: How the Prison
LitigationReform Act, Casey, andIqbal Combinewith Implicit Bias to EviscerateInmate Civil
Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 176, 218 (2015) ("Overinclusion of minority groups in the prison
population may make it even more difficult for (overwhelmingly White) judges to overcome
their implicit bias against both inmates and people of color.").
86. See Anderson, supra note 16.
87. Rachel Siegel, NordstromRackApologizesAfter Callingthe Policeon ThreeBlack
Teens Who Were Shopping for Prom, WAsH. Posr (May 9, 2018), https*//www.washington
post.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/08/nordstrom-rack-called-the-police-on-three-blackteens-who-were-shopping-for-prom/.
88. Cleve R. wootson Jr., A Black Yale Student FellAsleep in HerDorm's Common
Room. A White Student CalledPolice., WASH. POST (May 11, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/grade-point/wp/2018/05/10/a-black-yale-student-fell-asleep-in-her-dormscommon-room-a-white-student-called-police.
89. See Herron, supranote 1.
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Yale sociology Professor Elijah Anderson attributes these
apprehensions to white confusion over blacks occupying "the white
space" in public life, areas that were traditionally "off limits" to people
of color." By not conforming to the idea of the "iconic ghetto" 1 in
which African Americans are supposed to remain, completely innocent
people of color having a barbecue," attending a pool party," or
checking out of a home rental' elicit suspicion from a fearful white
majority.
"[F]or many whites, the anonymous black person in public is
always implicitly associated with the urban ghetto."' Thus, when a
white person sees a black person in the "white space," there exists an
unconscious idea, passed down over generations, from slavery to Jim
Crow to mass incarceration to the present day, that the black individual
is out of place and must only be there for a reason associated with the
"iconic ghetto"-crime, violence, or impoverished opportunistic gain.
This tension is exacerbated in today's complex sociological
landscape. African Americans appear more often in places ofprivilege,
power, and prestige in the diverse twenty-first century meritocracy. But
this progress, following nearly four hundred years of explicit racial
stereotyping, has proven unnerving to many white Americans. As one
researcher observed, the "lag between the rapidity of black progress
and white acceptance of that progress" may be responsible for the
impulse of many white Americans to view innocent behavior in "white
spaces" as suspicious or criminal."
This is the defining feature of the fourth wave of American racial
fear. "In times past, before the civil rights revolution, the color line was
more clearly marked. Both white and black people knew their so90. Anderson, supra note 16.
91. Anderson, supra note 19 ('In this sociological context, the urban ghetto is
presumed to be, descriptively, 'the place where the black people live.' But it's also,
stereotypically, a den of iniquity, a fearsome, impoverished place of social backwardness
where black people perpetrate all manner of violence and crime against one another.").
92. Gianluca Mezzoflore, A White Woman CalledPolice on Black People Barbecuing.
This Is How the Community Responded, CNN (May 22, 2018), https://www.can.com/2018/
05/22/us/white-woman-black-people-oaland-bbq-trnd/index.html.
Sarah Mervosh, A Black Man Wore Socks in the Pool. After Calling Police on
93.
Him, a Manager Got Fired, N.Y. TPAms (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.comt2Ol8/07/
09/us/memphis-pool-manager-fired-socks.html.
94. Daniel Victor, A Woman Said She Saw Burglars. They Were Just Black Airbnb
Guests., N.Y. TIMs (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/ustairbnb-blackwomen-police.html.
95.
Anderson, supra note 20.
96. Id
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called place, and for the most part, observed it. When people crossed
that line-black people, anyway-they faced legal penalties or extrajudicial violence."" Lacking these formal delineations of what
behavior is permitted where and by whom, racially fearful Americans
are increasingly turning to police to enforce an invisible color line by
complaining about such "suspicious" behavior as working out at a
gym" or waiting for a friend in a coffee shop. 9 This "white fragility"co
triggers a range of defensive reactions, including making frivolous 911
calls, further reinforcing the idea of the "iconic ghetto" and "shaping
the conception of the anonymous black person" four hundred years in
the making. 01
III. THE PERMANENCE OF RACIAL FEAR
With nearly four centuries of stoked racial fear woven into the
fabric of American society, one cannot expect attitudes to change
sufficiently to bring anything close to egalitarian racial treatment into
the criminal justice system.10 Social cognition research confirms that
these racist tropes are so deeply ingrained in our collective unconscious
that 10no3 amount of bias awareness will rid us of the epidemic of racial
fear.

97.

Id

98.

Rachel Siegel, LA Fitness Employees Called 911 on Two Black Men They Say

Didn'tPay. They Had, WAsLPosT (Apr. 20,2018), https/A/www.washingtonpost.com/news/
busiesswp/2018/04/20/la-fitness-employees-called-91 1-on-two-black-men-they-said-didatpay-they-had/.
99.

Rachel Siegel, Two Black Men Arrestedat Starbucks Settle with Philadelphiafor

$1 Each, WASH. PosT (May 3, 2018), https-//www.washingtonpost.comnews/business/wp/
2018/05/02/african-american-men-arrested-at-starbucks-reach-1-settlement-with-the-citysecure-promise-for-200000-grant-program-for-young-etrepreneurs/.
100. RoBiNDIANGELO, WHTE FRAGILnY: WHY IT'S So HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO
TALK ABouT RACISM 9-18 (2018) (asserting that racially segregated white people, lacking
consistent connections with people of color, respond defensively when confronted with an
uncomfortable situation).
101. Anderson, supra note 20.
102. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 5, at 2070 ("[In examining the history of how
'color' became associated with crime, it is important to recognize that the court decisions and
laws of early America were a convergence of two complementary themes: economics and
race.").
103. Aaron Mak, What Can &arbucks Accomplish?, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2018), https://

slate.com/echnology/2018/04/does-implicit-bias-training-work-starbucks-racial-bias-planwill-probably-fail.itmL See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Gmup
Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 (2002)

(discussing results of over 600,000 implicit association test tasks that demonstrate implicit
racial preferences).
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This Part explores the science of implicit bias, including the
pseudoscience of implicit bias retraining. By confronting the
permanency of racial fear, this Part lays the foundation for a reformed
system built on decreasing the quantity of police contact with
communities of color rather than solely on increasing the quality of
these contacts.
A.

ImplicitRacialBias and the Color of Crime

A half-century of social psychological research has repeatedly
demonstrated that virtually all individuals in the United States harbor
implicit, unconscious racial biases conforming to the myth of the
"black bogeyman.""1 These biases-automatic in nature and affecting
individuals from all races and classes-link dark-skinned individuals
with criminality and light-skinned individuals with innocence.' 5 The
pernicious pervasiveness of the "black bogeyman" trope is such that
"[p]eople possess these unconscious associations even if these
associations conflict with their consciously and genuinely held
beliefs."10
The implicit stereotypes most commonly held by civilians include
"the cultural stereotype of blacks, especially young men, as violent,
hostile, aggressive, and dangerous."" In the policing context, implicit
stereotypes can cause an officer who harbors no conscious racial
animosity and who rejects using race as a proxy for criminality to
unintentionally treat individuals differently based solely upon their
physical appearance." Thus, people of color targeted for unwarranted
suspicion by fearful civilians face two waves of implicit
discrimination: first, at the hands of the bias-motivated civilian who
makes the complaint, and second, at the hands of the officer who
responds to the complaint

104. Nosek et al, supranote 103.
105. L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and RacialAnxiety: Implicationsfor
Stops andFrisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 75 (2017).
106. Id
107. L. Song Richardson, Iplicit Racial Bias and the Fourth Amendment, in THE
CoNSTUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 59, 60 (John T. Parry & L.

Song Richardson eds., 2013); see Joshua Correl et al, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police
Officers andRacialBias in the Decision to SAoot, 92 J. PERSONALTIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006,
1013-15 (2007).
108. Richardson, supranote 105, at 75.
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Civilian Bias

Human beings categorize people and objects "to make sense of
experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully
with each one on an individual basis; we must categorize in order to
cope."'" Racial categorization, like most categorization processes,
occurs automatically, unintentionally, and without conscious
awareness. 110
The operation of these implicit stereotypes affects behaviors in
three ways. First, implicit biases can result in increased scrutiny of
certain citizens based upon their racial appearance." Second, these
biases can affect the evaluation of ambiguous behavior, causing
identical behavior to be interpreted differently depending upon the
racial appearance of the person performing the act." 2 Third, implicit
biases can cause individuals to treat members of different racial groups
disparately."' These biases-known respectively as attentional bias,
interpretation bias, and treatment bias-all play a role in civilian
weaponization of racial fear.
Attentional: Researchers consistently find that dark-skinned
individuals, especially young black men, capture the attention of
people before light-skinned individuals.11 4 Scientists "attribute this
difference in attention to the fact that people have automatic and rapid
threat reactions toward black men.""s
Interpretation: Once attention is directed toward dark-skinned
individuals, cultural stereotypes ofblack men as "violent, criminal, and
dangerous" affect the bystander's interpretation of the witnessed
behavior."' 6 One study found that individuals of all races "are more
ready to identify an ambiguous object as a dangerous weapon when in
109. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id the Ego, and EqualProtection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 337 (1987).
110. Id; see also L. Song Richardson, ArrestEfficiency andthe FourthAmendment, 95
MINN. L. REv. 2035,2042 (2011).
111. Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective
Atention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL 1322,1326-27 (2008).
112. Richardson, supra note 105, at 82.
113. See sources cited supranotes 109-112.
114. Trawalter et al., supra note 111, at 1327.
115. Richardson, supra note 110, at 2044; see also Richardson, supra note 105, at 76
("[T]his attentional bias is correlated not with conscious racial attitudes, but rather, with how
strongly the perceiver unconsciously associates Blacks with danger.").
116. Jules Holroyd, ImplicitRacialBias andthe Anatomy oflnstitutionalRacism, Cr.
CRIME & JUST. STUDS., https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publicationscjm/article/implicitracial-bias-and-anatomy-institutional-racism (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).

TULANE LAW REVIEW

952

[Vol. 93:931

Another study
the hands of a black male than a white male."' 17
requiring participants to observe and rate ambiguous physical contact
between two people found that participants overwhelmingly rated the
contact as deliberate, aggressive, and hostile when at least one of the
Unconscious racial biases "can even
individuals was black."
influence how people read another's facial expressions, with identical
expressions being evaluated as more hostile on a Black face than on a
White face."119
Treatment: Not surprisingly, researchers find that bystanders
modify their behavior when in the presence of a person of color,
particularly during an interracial encounter.12 0 One study found that, in
such encounters, white individuals become increasingly uncomfortable
and are more likely to respond defensively.12 1 People of color also tend
to change their behavior during interracial interactions, with their
behaviors becoming "more rigid and less warm and friendly than [they]
would be in a nonthreatening context." 2 2 These responses can make
each party appear unfriendly and uncomfortable, which has the effect
of "confirming" the implicit bias of African Americans as hostile and
aggressive.123
2.

Police Bias

Police officers are not immune to the influence of implicit racial
biases on their perceptions. Researchers have shown that officers

&

117. Id; see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudiceand Perception-The Role ofAutomatic and
ControlledProcesses in Miperceivinga Weapon, 81 J. PERSONAUrY & Soc. PSYCHOL 181,
187 (2001) (providing results from an experiment testing the effect of racial information on the
speed with which participants identified weapons).
118. I Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racialand Behavioral Cues in Black
and White Children'sPerceptionsofAmbiguouslyAggressiveActs, 39 J. PERSONAUT1Y& Soc.
PSYCHOL. 590, 593-96 (1980).
119. Richardson, spra note 105, at 77; see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V.
Bodenhausen, FacingPrejudice:Implicit Prejudiceand the Perception ofFacial Threat, 14
PSYCHOL. Sci. 640,640-43 (2003) (describing further the effects of racial bias on the way study
participants interpreted facial expressions).
120. See Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Stereotype Threat in Interracial
Interactions,in STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPUCATION231, 238 (Michael
Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012).
121. Id.
122. Richardson, supra note 105, at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting Richeson
Shelton, suprrnote 120, at 238).
123. See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the
Constitution in SerualAssault Cases,48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637,676 (2016).
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similarly experience attentional bias, interpretation bias, and treatment
bias. 124
Attentional: In one study, researchers found that unconscious
biases "associating Blacks with dangerousness caused officers'
attention to be drawn to Black faces over White faces."1 25 This study
also showed that once an officer's attention was focused on a black
face, that attention was held longer than attention to a white face. 12 1
Interpretation:"[T]he unconscious association between Blacks
and crime [also] influences how quickly officers identify weapons. In
computer simulations, officers are quicker to determine that individuals
are armed when they are Black as opposed to White."l2 7 Even when
no evidence exists to suggest the presence of a weapon, "automatic
stereotype activation can cause officers to interpret behavior as
aggressive, violent, or suspicious even if identical behavior performed
by a white individual would not be so interpreted."l 28 The conrfonted
individual may respond in kind, thus unconsciously fulfilling officers'
beliefs that the individual is suspicious and aggressive. 1 29
Researchers have also observed that officers are more likely to
assume a black individual will view them as racist and illegitimate,
increasing the likelihood that the officers will feel unsafe, and thus
increasing the likelihood of an unnecessarily violent encounter." 0
Treatment Researchers also find that, when officers automatically
focus attention on black individuals as dangerous and unconsciously
interpret their behaviors as hostile, they are more likely to conduct
unnecessary stops and frisks triggered not by conscious racial animus

124. See Richardson, supranote 105, at 74-77.
125. Id at 76 (citing Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 886-87 (2004)).
126. Id
127. Id at 77. Social psychologists explain this reaction as a consequence of automatic
racial categorization; it simply "takes less time for the mind to process information that is
congruent with racial stereotypes." Id This automatic processing has two troubling effects.
First, officers are more likely to act quickly on the incorrect belief that African Americans are
armed and to respond with unnecessary lethal force. Id Second, officers may take longer to
correctly identify that a white individual is armed, thus increasing the risk that the weapon will
be used before police can respond. Id
128. Richardson, supra note 110, at 2053.
129. This "stress ofracial anxiety is associated with a variety of physiological responses
including sweating, increased heart rate, facial twitches, fidgeting, and avoiding eye contact."
Richardson, supra note 105, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
130. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Illegitimacy Is Dangerous: How Authorities
Experience andReact to Illegitimacy, 4 PsYCHOL. 340, 343 (2013).
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but by implicit racial biases.'3 1 The objective but easily malleable
standards of "reasonable suspicion" and "reasonable force" do little to
constrain officers from acting on these implicit biases. 3 2 1In short,
social cognition confirms how implicit biases "perpetuate
discrimination through covertly influencing who is deemed suspicious,
who is stopped and searched, who is deemed a threat, what
determinations of 'reasonable force' are made, who is judged to be
armed and dangerous, and who gets shot." 3
B.

The Limits ofRetrainingEfforts

Given the overwhelming evidence of implicit racial bias and the
devastating effects these biases can have, implicit bias "retraining"
programs have proliferated in an attempt to make individuals aware of
their biases and encourage them to refrain from acting on them."*
Corporations in the United States began offering these "diversity"
trainings in earnest in 2013. " Perhaps most famously, Starbucks
closed nearly 8000 store locations on May 29, 2018, to conduct
mandatory racial bias training in response to a viral video showing the
arrest of two black men who had been sitting quietly in a Philadelphia
Starbucks after the store's manager called the police to report the men
for trespassing.3 6
The response by implicit bias experts was as surprising as it was
uniform: these types of racial bias trainings simply do not work. Many
pointed to the fact that these "one size fits all" solutions are not
sufficiently tailored to the unique problems faced in different locations
by different people to have any real impact.1 37 More fimdamentally,
though, implicit bias experts expressed grave skepticism that any such
program can have a lasting impact on behavior. As Brian Nosek, a
University of Virginia psychology professor and cofounder of a
nonprofit organization promoting awareness of implicit bias, observed,
"I have been studying this since 1996, and I still have implicit bias....
131. Richardson, supra note 105, at 83 ("They will be stopped and frisked more often
than similarly situated Whites, not because they are acting more suspiciously, but because
implicit biases will impact how police interpret their ambiguous behaviors.").
132. Id
133. Holroyd, supranote 116.
134.. Mak, supra note 103.
135. Id
136. Press Release, Starbucks, Starbucks to Close All Stores Nationwide for RacialBias Education on May 29 (Apr. 17, 2018), https://news.starbucks.com/press-releases/
starbucks-to-close-stores-nationwide-for-racial-bias-education-may-29.
137. Mak, supra note 103.
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'

We can be sure that training by itself is not going to get rid of implicit
bias."l 38
Perhaps most damning was the response of Anthony Greenwald,
one of the creators of the Implicit Association Test that helps
researchers and individuals identify implicit bias. When asked to
comment on Starbucks's training, Greenwald stated:
Starbucks would be wise to check out the scientific evidence on implicit
bias training.... [TJhis training has not been shown to be effective, and
it can even be counterproductive. It will appear that Starbucks is doing
the right thing, but the training is not likely to change anything. The
Implicit Association Test is a valuable educational device to allow people
to discover their own implicit biases. However, taking the IAT to
discover one's own implicit biases does nothing to remove or reduce
those implicit biases. Desire to act free of implicit bias is not sufficient
to enable action free of implicit bias."'
A wide-ranging study of 800 U.S. corporations that had
implemented mandatory racial bias training "ultimately found that the
positive effects of diversity training often don't last beyond two days,
and may actually entrench biases due to backlash.""4 According to one
of the study's authors, "The studies that look out six months to a year
tend to be equally likely to show increased bias after the training as they
are to show decreased bias."l 4
The limits of these retraining efforts are understandable given the
inherently automatic nature of implicit bias. "[B]rain scans reveal that
the amygdala, a section of the brain associated with fear, responds more
when people view Black male faces as opposed to White male
faces."l42 This kind of hard wiring can be almost impossible to undo,
particularly when that wiring has been reinforced by centuries of
explicit racial bias.
But even if these institutional retraining programs worked, they
would solve only one side of the implicit bias equation. The negative
treatment people of color receive often causes them to implicitly
respond in kind, creating a "self-fulfilling prophecy or behavioral
138. Id
139. Herzog, supra note 21.
140. Mak, supra note 103; see Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity
PaogramsFail,HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 2016, at 52.
141. Mak, supra note 103. Similar studies have criticized the efficacy of racial bias
training programs within police departments. See Tom James, Can Cops Unlearn Their
Unconscious Biases?, ATLANnc (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/12/implicit-bias-training-salt-lake/548996/.
142. Richardson, supra note 105, at 76.
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confirmation effect" 14 3 Even when not directly confronted with a biasmotivated police officer, people of color may automatically respond
with apprehension, aggression, or hostility-precisely the types of
behaviors officers are trained to view with suspicion.'" No amount of
institutionalized police department training can similarly "retrain" the
inherent distrust and fear people of color feel and exhibit when
confronted by law enforcement
Institutionalized racial bias trainings also do not alter the
unconscious behaviors of the bias-motivated civilians who call police
in the first place, at least in most situations. While Starbucks
presumably sought to train its employees not to call the police on
patrons for "living while black," the typical civilian does not have the
benefit of institutionally mandated sensitivity training before calling
911 to report a suspicious person for sleeping while black, 145 selling
lemonade or water while black,'" or eating a sandwich while black. 4 1
The pervasiveness and permanence of racial fear, the limited
efficacy of retraining programs in reducing racial fear, and the inability
of these programs to address the fear of civilian bystanders all suggest
that little can be done to reduce or eliminate racial bias from police
interactions. Thus, this Article suggests that the focus should shift
away from trying to change only the quality of police interactions with
persons of color and toward limiting the quantity of such interactions,
at least when no clearly articulable reason exists for the interaction.
The balance of the Article explores this suggestion.

143. Id at 80.
144. See Richardson, supra note 110, at 2052 ("This behavioral confirmation effect
'provide[s] a powerfd mechanism by which stereotypes and prejudicial behavior are
maintained, propagated and justified' since 'the perceiver interprets the target's behavior in
line with the expectancy and encodes yet another instance of stereotype-consistent behavior."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral
Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfdlmg Consequences of Automatic Stereotype
Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 541, 542 (1997))).
145. See Wootson, supranote 88.
146. Drew Costley, Black Owner of SF Lemonade Stand Has Police Called on Him
While 7)ying to Open His Business, SF GATE, https*//www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Blackowner-of-SF-lemonade-police-Gourmonade-13094735.php (last updated July 22, 2018);
Permit Patty: Woman 'Calls Police'on Eight-Year-Oldfor Selling Water, BBC (June 25,
2018), https*//www.bbc.comi/news/newsbeat-44601668.
147. Breanna Edwards, #EatingOutWhileBlack:Subway Employee Calls 911 on Black
Family Because She Thought They Would Rob Her, RooT (July 5, 2018), httpsi//www.the
root.com/eatingoutwhileblack-subway-employee-calls-91 1-on-blac-1827358215.
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IV. CIVILIAN LICENSE TO WEAPONIZE RACIAL FEAR

The previous subparts highlighted the history and permanency of
irrational racial fear in modem American society and the consistency
with which this fear permeates the criminal justice system to the
detriment of people of color. Within that context, one might expect
states to make every effort to deter civilians from weaponizing these
fears through frivolous, bias-motivated accusations of criminality to
law enforcement.
That is not the case. In fact, in many ways the opposite is true.
This Part highlights the dual problems of nonemergency calls
overwhelming 911 call centers and dispatchers' lack of discretion in
responding to these calls. It then zeroes in on the unique problem of
police response to racially fearful, frivolous 911 calls, starting with an
illustrative snapshot of racially motivated 911 calls over a thirty-day
period in 2018. This Part then discusses the devastating impacts of
such calls on communities of color, including reinforcing community
distrust, promoting over-enforcement and under-enforcement of
communities of color, perpetuating disproportionate mass
incarceration of black men through mandatory "warrant checks," and
providing continued opportunities for unnecessary physical
degradation of black bodies by police officers.
A.

Misuse andAbuse ofEmergency Response Systems

Drawing from records maintained by separate regional call
centers, the National Emergency Number Association (NENA)
estimates that approximately 240 million 911 calls are placed
nationally each year.1' While no national statistics exist, dispatch
centers around the country report that an overwhelming number of
these calls are frivolous.149 The majority of these calls are either purely
unintentional dials or cases of honest but mistaken use of the system
for nonemergencies.15 0

Police agencies and organizations studying 911 usage distinguish
between two types of inappropriate calls: unintentional and
intentional.s' The former is labeled a "misuse" of the system, while

148. 9-1-1- Statistics, NAT'L EMERGENCY NUMBER Ass'N, https://www.nena.org/page/
911Statistics (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
149. Sampson, supranote 14.
150. Id
151. Id
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the latter is called an "abuse" of the system.1 s2 Unintentional calls
occur when a person or phone inadvertently dials 911, either through a
phantom 911 call, 911 misdial, or 911 hang-up. 153
Intentional calls, or abuses of 911, generally fall into one of four
categories: nonemergency calls, exaggerated emergency calls, lonely
complaint calls, and prank calls." Racially fearful complaints about
criminal behavior fall in either the nonemergency or exaggerated
emergency category, depending on the circumstances. Regionally,
several of the nation's largest and most overworked law enforcement
jurisdictions report that as many as half, sometimes well over that
amount, of all intentional 911 calls are for "nonemergencies." 55
For example, one study found that "[m]ore than half of the calls
to the San Diego County Sheriffs Department's 911 line are frivolous
ones that tie up phone lines and keep the department from handling lifeThese frivolous calls ranged from
threatening emergencies." 5
Disneyland to reports of broken
at
weather
the
questions about
157
In Sacramento, officials estimate that, year over year, as
toilets.
many as eighty percent of all 911 calls are frivolous. 158 Florida
dispatchers have expressed similar frustration, with Palm Beach
County dispatchers handling as many as 400,000 "nonemergency"
calls per year, and the Broward Sheriff's Department estimating that
half of its 2.5 million annual calls are frivolous. 159
Occasionally, particularly humorous or egregious 911 call
transcripts make national news, such as when a Texas man called 911
to order a cab, a Florida man called 911 to complain that a Subway
152. Id
153. Id Many 911 misdials take place in locations with area codes starting with "9-1-."
Hang-ups are more difficult to quantify as their own category, as dispatchers assume that many
hang-ups begin as misdials once the caller recognizes their mistake. Id
154. Id
155. See, e.g., M. Alex Johnson, 911 Systems Choking on Non-Emergency Calls, NBC
NEws (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26040857/nstus news-crimeandcourts/
t/systems-choking-non-emergency-calls/ (reporting that forty-five percent of 911 calls across
California were frivolous, as high as eighty percent in Sacramento); Kenneth Ma, Frivolous
911 Calls DrainShenfIs Resources, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2001) https*//www.
sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-frivolous-91 1-callsdrain-sheriffs-resources-2001febl9-story.
html (reporting that about sixty-five percent of the calls to the San Diego County Sheriffs
Department's 911 line were frivolous and that only twenty percent reported real emergencies).
156. Ma, supra note 155, at 124.
157. Id
158. Johnson, supranote 155.
911
159. Robert Nolin, Drunken Dialing, Mental Confusion, Can Prompt Frivolous
812 2 7
0
Calls, PALM BEACH PosT, https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20100913/NEWS/
192 (last updated Apr. 1, 2012).
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sandwich artist failed to put mayonnaise on his sandwich, or a
Tennessee man called to complain that his stepfather wanted him to do
the laundry.' But system administrators warn that "911 systems are
being choked with clueless, frivolous, even prank, calls."' A Knox
County, Tennessee, 911 dispatcher put it plainly: "You've got a true
emergency with somebody out there-that there's a shooting or
something-then those officers are not able to respond to that
emergency call, because they're taking care" of 911 abusers.162
B.

Police andDispatcherResponse to Frivolous911 Calls

When police departments first began developing 911 emergency
call systems in the 1970s, they were lauded for taking a "professional"
approach to "reduc[ing] response time to the absolute minimum" when
a civilian needed help.'
But as early as 1990, officers were
complaining about "the 'tyranny' of 911," referring to the sheer amount
of time police spent responding to an endless stream of calls." One of
the great benefits of having a number the public could easily remember
in an emergency also became a significant hindrance as frivolous calls
flooded the lines.'
But rather than exercise discretion by ignoring
calls, officers are often judged by the speed with which they respond to
a call "rather than how much good they do for victims or for crime
control."' 66
In the three decades since 911 misuse and abuse first became a
problem, many departments around the country have adopted
innovative approaches to make police responses more efficient.
"[S]ome cities have adopted 311, a non-emergency, easy-to-remember
number for police assistance and other public services." 67 Miami,
Florida, utilizes public service aides-uniformed but unarmed quasimediators dispatched to handle certain 911 calls that appear to be

160. Johnson, sqpranote 155.
161. Id
162. Id
163. David C. Anderson, Editorial, The '7)ranny' of9)1, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 17, 1990,
at A22.
164. Id Officers also lamented the 'reactive posture" the system put them in. "Only
rarely can the police respond quickly enough to stop a crime in progress. Instead, the 911
system forces police into a reactive posture, rolling in after a crime occurs to take information
that might or might not lead to an arrest." Id
165. PoliceTake D60erentApproaches to 'The 7ranny of911,'supranote 15.
166. Anderson, supra note 163.
167. PoliceTake DiferentApproaches to 'The Tyranny of 911,'supranote 15.
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nonemergencies.' 68 But the vast majority ofpolice departments around
the country still broadly require a uniformed, armed police officer to
respond to any 911 call describing a purported criminal "event" in
progress, no matter how clearly lawful the event sounds. 69
Before the 911 call is routed to an officer, there exists a surprising
lack of discretion for the dispatcher who first receives the call. The
dispatcher quoted in the beginning of this Article who handled the call
regarding an African-American woman with a shopping cart explained
that, in her seventeen years of experience, all calls had to be routed to
officers.1 70 Her experience mirrors that of virtually all 911 call centers
in the country.171

While no discretion exists in deciding whether to dispatch an
officer at all,1 72 dispatchers have significant discretion in how they
"code" calls. Many dispatch centers utilize a priority system, with
"Priority 1" calls reserved for clear, imminent threats to life and
property, and "Priority 2" and "Priority 3" designations used for less
serious threats. 173 But this priority system still requires dispatchers to
74
route all calls-even "Priority 3" calls-to officers for response.1 In
many cases, such as in a major metropolitan area with an overworked
police force, officers may not have an opportunity to respond to
"Priority 3" calls simply given the scarcity of law enforcement
resources.' 7 5 But nothing prevents an idle-or worse, biased-officer
from responding to a lower priority call. And in many cases, they do.
In fact, the now-infamous 911 call reporting an African-American
family for barbecuing in a park in Oakland was initially coded as a

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id
See, e.g., id. (discussing the effect of an overload of 911 calls on police response).
See Herron, supranote 1.
See, e.g., Police Take DferentApproaches to 'The 7rannyof 911,' supra note

15.
172. See id
173. See Herron, supranote 1 ("[A] Priority 3 call. . . essentially means 'not important'
... ."). Different dispatch systems utilize different priority levels and codes. Shawn Messinger
et al., The DistributionofEmergency PoliceDispatch Call Incident ypes andPriorityLevels
Within the Police PriorityDispatch System, 1 ANNALs EMERGENCY DISPATCH & RESPONSE,
no. 2, 2013, at 14-17 (analyzing nationwide data regarding how calls are coded and routed).
174. See, e.g., Ed Gilgor, Is Your 911 Call a Priority?,GRANT PARK NEIGHBORHOOD
ASS'N, http*//grantpark.org/mfo/16029 (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (describing four priority
levels for which an officer could be dispatched in Atlanta, Georgia, including nonemergency
"routine" calls).
175. See id
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"Priority 3" call to which multiple armed officers nevertheless
responded.176
C

911 Callsfor "Living While Black"

The automatic response of dispatchers and police officers to
millions of nonemergency calls each year highlights the woefully
inefficient allocation of resources plaguing police departments and
emergency response organizations across the country. But when
civilians make nonemergency frivolous calls for racially motivated
reasons, the consequences extend far beyond overtaxing an
overworked system.
In recent years, Americans have paid increased attention to "how
police too often respond to black people who haven't committed a
crime: as if they were a deadly threat."1 " But focusing only on the
police response to suspected criminal activity and not the civilians who
generated the suspicion in the first place, "lets everyone else involved
in these incidents off the hook." 17
In many ways, "calling the police is the epitome of escalation.""17
African-American scholars and commentators argue that white callers
summoning armed officers against innocent black behavior is more
than frivolous: "[T]hese callers aren't expecting cops to treat black
folks politely, but instead to remind them that the consequences for
making white people angry or uncomfortable could be harassment,
unfair prosecution or death."'8 o
The following subparts provide an illustrative snapshot of this
weaponized racial fear and consider the immediate and devastating
long-term consequences of frivolous, race-based 911 calls.

176. See sources cited supranotes 1-2.
177. Patton & Farley, supranote 4.
178. Jason Johnson, From Starbucks to Hashtags: We Need to Talk About Why White
Americans Call the Police on Black People, Roor (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.theroot.
com/from-starbucks-to-hashtags-we-need-to-talk-about-why-w-1825284087/amp?
twitter
impression-true; Patton & Farley, supra note 4 ("[Mlost of the time, there is no consequence
for the people who weaponize their fear and use the police as an extension of their whiteness.").
179. Johnson, supra note 178.
180. Patton & Farley, supra note 4 (stressing that calling 911 on black people for
innocent conduct is "the continuation of a racist American tradition with deep historical roots:
Private citizens and police using feckless interpretations of the law to convert blackness into
criminal trespass"); see also Johnson, supra note 178 ("[Clalling the police on black people
for noncrimes is a step away from asking for a tax-funded beatdown, if not an execution.").
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A Thirty-Day Snapshot of Racial Fear: April-May 2018

In a one-month period from approximately mid-April to mid-May
2018, national media saturated airwaves with news coverage of
Caucasians calling 911 to report "suspicious activity" by African
Americans that could only be reasonably characterized as innocent
behavior. Civilians called police to investigate black Americans for
sitting quietly in a Starbucks, 18 ' barbecuing in a park,1 82 playing golf
"too slow,"' 8 3 working out at a gym,'" moving into a new apartment,1

5

outfit, 187

'

buying a money
flying on a plane,"' shopping for a prom
order to pay rent,"' checking out of an AirBnB rental,'18 and taking a
nap in the common area of a college dormitory.'9
The response by dispatchers and police to these frivolous calls
varied in each circumstance, but in one very important respect the
response was the same-the dispatchers notified police and armed
police officers personally investigated-no matter how patently
frivolous the call or wasteful the use of scarce law enforcement
resources. The following narratives illustrate the consistency with
which such frivolous calls are made and the uniformity with which
officers respond to these bias-motivated calls.
181. See Siegel, supranote 99.
182. See Mezzofiore, supranote 92.
183. Rachel Siegel, White GofCourse Owners Said Five African American Women
Were PlayingToo Slowly. Then They Calledthe Police., WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2018), https//
www.washingtonpost.com/news/businesswp/2018/04/24/white-golf-course-owners-said-fiveafrican-american-women-were-playi-too-slow-then-they-caled-the-police/.
184. See Siegel, supranote 98.
185. Eli Rosenberg, A Black Former White House Stafer Was Moving into a New
Apartment. Someone Reported a Burglaiy., WASH. POST (May 1, 2018), https*//www.
washingtonpost.com/inewpost-nation/wp/2018/05/01/a-black-former-white-house-staf fr-wasmoving-into-a-new-apartment-someone-reported-a-burglary/.
186. Allison Klein, American Airlines Passenger: 'The Cops Were Calledon Me for
Flying While Fat & Black,' WASH. PosT (Apr. 30, 2018), hftps*/www.washingtonpostcom
news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/04/30/american-airlines-passenger-the-cops-were-called-on-mefor-flying-while-fat-black/.
187. See Siegel, supranote 87.
188. Rachel Rice, Schnucks Apologizes, FiresEmployee Who HadRun-in with Black
Couple over Money Order, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH (May 9, 2018), https-//www.stltoday.
coniniews/1ocal/metrolsdmnucks-apologizes-fires-employee-who-had-run-in-with-black/article
_fdf75c29-5778-5b81-bc6b-5e0765eb7ef7.html.
189. See Victor, supranote 94.
190. See Wootson, supranote 88.
191. Most media coverage of the events described in this section used a similar"
While Black' headline to catch readers' attention and summarize the absurdity of the
encounter, such as "Sitting in Starbucks While Black," 'Flying While Black," or
"#AirBnBWhileBlack." I have chosen instead to use the names of the individuals targeted by
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Rashon Nelson and Donte Robinson

On April 12, 2018, at approximately 4:35 p.m., Rashon Nelson
and Donte Robinson walked into a Philadelphia Starbucks and Nelson
asked to use the restroom.19 2 When the store manager stated that
restrooms were for paying customers only, the two men settled down
at a table to wait for a scheduled 4:45 p.m. business meeting. 9 3 At 4:37
p.m., approximately two minutes after the men entered the store, the
white store manager called 911 and reported the men for "refusing to
make a purchase or leave."" Four minutes later, multiple police
officers arrived on scene, handcuffed Nelson and Robinson, and took
them outside to their squad car.195
b.

Tshyrad Oates

On April 15, 2018, Tshyrad Oates and a friend-both black
men-were working out at an L.A. Fitness gym in Seacaucus, New
Jersey, when they were mistakenly accused of not paying for access."*
Although the white employee making the accusation had checked the
men in under valid membership and guest passes less than thirty
minutes earlier, she loudly confronted the men in front of other patrons
and threatened to call the police if they did not leave immediately."*
Ten minutes later, the store's manager told Oates that he was banned
from the gym and that his friend's membership had been terminated."
By this point, five uniformed police officers arrived, having responded
to a 911 call about two men who "were refusing to leave due to them
not showing their membership cards."'" The two men left voluntarily
without being arrested, but not before shooting a video of the busy gym
the racially motivated calls, in part to illustrate that most people do not know or remember the
names of the people involved in these high-profile incidents because, fortunately, the incidents
did not end in tragedy. But in a different context, with a different first responder, any one of
these individuals could have tragically joined the long list of more well-known targets of racial
fear, including Michael Brown, Eic Garner, Tamir Rice, Sandra Bland, Freddie Gray,
Philando Castile, Stephon Clark, and Alton Sterling.
192. Rachel Siegel, 'They Can'tBe Herefor Us': Blk Men ArrestedatStarbucks Tell
Their Story for the First Time, WASH. PosT (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/business/wp2018/04/19/they-cant-be-here-for-us-black-men-arrested-at-staibucks
-tell-their-story-for-the-first-time/.
193. Id
194. Id
195. Id
196. See Siegel, supra note 98.
197. Id
198. Id
199. Id
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showing that they were the only African-American patrons in the
facility at the time. 200
c.

Sandra Thompson

On April 21, 2018, Sandra Thompson, president of the York
County, Pennsylvania, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and four of her African-American friends
were playing golf at a club in Dover Township, Pennsylvania, a mostly
white suburb.2 0 1 After playing only one hole, a white advisor to the
club reprimanded the women for playing too slowly and threatened to
cancel their memberships if they did not leave "our" premises.2 02
the women ignored the demand and continued playing, a co-owner of
the golf course sarcastically congratulated the women as "real winners"
and advised them that police were on the way.203 Multiple officers
arrived and quickly determined that there was "no need for [police] to
be there."2 M
d.

Kenzie Smith

On April 29, 2018, a group of African-American friends set up a
charcoal grill for a Sunday barbecue in a common "BBQ zone" in
Oakland, California's Lake Merritt Park.205 A white woman in the park
called 911 to report that someone was illegally using a charcoal grill
and requested that the situation be dealt with immediately.2 0 One of
the women at the gathering recorded the encounter, during which the
white woman can be heard accusing the group of trespassing in a public
park and threatening that they would all be going to jail.207 When police
200. Id
201. See Siegel, supra note 183.
202. Id
203. Jason Duaine Hahn, Black Women Speak Out After Golf Club Called Police and
Accused Their Group of Playing Too Slowly, PEOPLE (Apr. 25, 2018), https*J/people.com/
human-interest/black-women-golf-club-controversy/.
204. See Siegel, supra note 183 (quoting Northern York County Regional Police Chief
Mark Bentzel).
205. See Mezzofiore, supranote 92.
206. Id
207. Yesha Callahan, #CookingOutWhileBlack White Woman Calls Cops on Black
People Cooking Out in Oaklam4 Cahy, Park Roor (May 10, 2018), https://www.theroot.com/
cookingoutwhileblack-white-woman-calls-cops-n-black-1825920347. At least one bystander
claimed the woman hurled racial epithets towards the group and used a racist slur to refer to
the videographer. Momo Chang, Kenzie Smith Speaks Out, EAST BAY ExPRESs (May 30,
ut/Contentoid=1651
2018), httpse/www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/kenzie-smith-se
3492.
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arrived, they took down a police report but made no arrests and allowed
the barbecue to continue. 28
e.

Kelly Fyffe-Marshall, Komi-Oluwa Olafimihan, and
Donisha Prendergast

On April 30, 2018, at approximately 12:30 p.m., three AfricanAmerican friends were checking out of an AirBnB rental in Rialto,
California, when an elderly white neighbor called police because she
didn't recognize the vehicle or the people and saw them loading a car
with suitcases.2 0 The police department responded to a potential inprogress residential burglary by dispatching seven police cars and a
helicopter.210 Police arrived almost immediately and informed the three
friends that a helicopter was tracking thern21 1 According to Kelly
Fyffe-Marshall, "They locked down the neighborhood and had. us
standing in the street." 2 12 Fyffe-Marshall, a filmmaker, began
recording the incident, which showed a swarm of police vehicles in a
sleepy suburban neighborhood surrounding the three friends.2 13 A
sergeant arrived and ordered the individuals' detention after stating he
had never heard of AirBnB but relented when other officers who were
aware of the house-sharing company cleared up the confusion.21 4
f.

Mekhi Lee, Eric Rogers, and Dirone Taylor

On May 3,2018, Mekhi Lee, Eric Rogers, and Dirone Taylor were
shopping at a Nordstrom Rack near St. Louis, Missouri, "when they
208. Id
209. Black Filmmakers Swarmed by Police After Checking Out ofAirbnb Say They

Were Racially Profdec4 CBS LA (May 7, 2018), https://losangeles.cbslocaLcom/2018/05/
07/black-fllmmakers-swarmed-police-airbnb-racially-profiled/. The 911 caller later admitted
that she called police when the black Airbnb guests did not smile or wave at her. See Victor,
supra note 94.
210. Black Filmmakers Swarmed by Police After Checking Out ofAirbnb Say They
Were RaciallyProfie4 supranote 209.

211. Id
212. Gabby Ferreira, 3 Black Women Were Leaving an Airbnb. A Neighbor Thought

They Were Stealing, Police Say, SAN LUis OBISPO TRIB. (May 7, 2018), https//www.sanluis
obispo.com/news/state/califomia/article210657094.htmL
213. Id.
214. Sam Levin, Airbnb: PoliceHelicopterTargets Black GuestsAfterNeighborFears

Burglars, GUAIDIAN (May 7, 2018), https//www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/07/
airbnb-black-guests-california-police-heicopter.
Fyffe-Marshall later posted about the
incident, stating that at first they 'joked about the misunderstanding," but it escalated
immediately. "We have been dealing with different emotions and you want to laugh about this
but it's not funy.... The trauma is real." Victor, supranote 94 (quoting an Instagram post
authored by Fyffe-Marshall following the event).
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noticed store employees closely eyeing them and following them
through the aisles."21 5 At one point, an elderly white patron referred to
the teens as "a bunch of bums" and asked, "Would your parents and
grandparents be proud of what you're doing?"2 16 When the men
reached the register to check out, they noticed the white store manager
escort the elderly lady out of the store and overheard other white
employees calling the police.2 17 When the men exited the store, they
were greeted by police who said they had been alerted to three black
men shoplifting.2 1 8 The officers quickly determined that no crime had
been committed and left.2 19
g.

Lolade Siyonbola

On May 8, 2018, thirty-four-year-old African-American graduate
student Lolade Siyonbola fell asleep in the common room of her Yale
University dorm 0 A white student walked into the room, turned on
the lights, and told her, "You're not supposed to be sleeping here. I'm
going to call the police."' Four officers arrived and interrogated
Siyonbola, stating that they received a call reporting "somebody who
appeared they weren't ... where they were supposed to be."m
Siyonbola recorded the entire interrogation, which showed officers
declining to question the white complainant standing by but demanding
Siyonbola prove her enrollment even though she unlocked her dorm
room right in front of them." The officers eventually relented after
Siyonbola later told "Good Morning
nearly twenty minutes3"
America" that she recorded and posted the video for her safety. "I have
always said to myself since Sandra Bland was killed. I said to myself
if I ever have an encounter with police I'll film myself."m
215. See Siegel, supra note 87.
216. Id (quoting St. Louis NAACP President Adolphus Pruitt's account of the event).
217. Id
218. Id
219. Id
220. See wootson, supra note 88.
221. Brandon Griggs, A Black Yale Graduate Student Took a Nap in Her Dorm's
Common Room. so a White Student Called Police, CNN (May 12, 2018), https*//www.cnn.
com/2018/05/09/us/yale-student-napping-black-trnd/Mdex.hltnL
222. Id (omission in original).
223. Id
224. Karma Allen, Black Student Interrogated After Napping at Yale: I Posted Pldeo
'For My Safety': EXCLUSIVE, ABC NEWS (May 14, 2018), htps*//abcnews.go.com/betastory-container/US/black-student-interrogated-napping-yale-posted-video-safety/story?id=55
141393.
225. Id
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Lessons from the Thirty-Day Snapshot

In each of the incidents above, the 911 dispatcher either failed to
or lacked the discretion to exercise independent judgment and decline
to send armed police officers to respond to a clearly nonthreatening
event."' Similarly, in each incident the police let the callers use them
to weaponize the callers' own biases without exercising adequate
independent judgment and declining to confront innocent people of
color without justification."
This thirty-day snapshot is an illustrative, but by no means
exhaustive, account of the nature and types of racial fears weaponized
through emergency response systems. These examples help frame the
context for discussing possible solutions to the problem, because they
highlight several important variables that each merit scrutiny when
fashioning a legal or policy remedy: (1) the precise (or vague)
articulation of the fear by the caller; (2) the response of the dispatcher
to the caller; (3) the communication of concern from the dispatcher to
the officer; (4) the response of the officer to both the alleged suspect
and, when present, the caller; (5) the response of the police department
after the incident; and (6) the response of any relevant corporation or
institution after the incident
One further point merits mention here. This snapshot does not
make the case that bias-motivated 911 calls are on the rise, as many
have claimed.22 Although some preliminary evidence suggests a
"surge" in these types of calls, the evidence to date is inconclusive.2 9
More likely, the ubiquity of high-definition cell phone video cameras,
coupled with the viral nature of the videos when posted to social media,
increases awareness of a long-existent trend23 Indeed, recent research
suggests that people are more likely to read, absorb, and deem stories
that reinforce their own political beliefs as having "greater intrinsic
news importance.""' Thus, those more sympathetic to racial justice
causes or sensitive to police violence may be more likely to read and
share stories of weaponized racial fear.

226. See sources cited supra note 15 (discussing the lack of discretion 911 dispatchers
have in sending officers to respond to all calls).
227. See Takei, supra note 30.
228. See Anderson, supra note 20.
229. See id
230. Id
231. Harold Pashler & Gail Heriot, Perceptions ofNewsworthiness Are Contaminated
by a Political Usefudness Bias, RoYAL Soc'Y OPEN Sci., Aug. 1, 2018, at 1.
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But even if both suppositions are true-that the rate of racially
fearful 911 calls has remained static and that preexisting attitudes about
race and criminal justice affect how much attention one pays to the
issue-neither diminishes the reality of racial fear nor the importance
of confronting the problem. The discussion that follows explores the
devastating and far-reaching consequences of weaponized racial fear.
D.

The Impacts of Civilian Weaponization

1.

Community Distrust

A growing number of political science researchers have
demonstrated that an individual's view of and trust in government are
most significantly correlated to their direct experience with the
government.23 2 For many, that experience comes at the hands of a
police officer. When police officers enforce the racial biases of private
citizens, they convert those biases into governmental discrimination,
which undermines the legitimacy of law enforcement.2 33
Research consistently shows that minorities are more likely than
whites to view law enforcement with suspicion and distrust.3 4 This
suspicion and distrust can heighten anxieties and increase the risk of an
unnecessarily violent confrontation.23 5 More broadly, this distrust,
which can erode the lawfulness and legitimacy of police officers, is
exacerbated when officers respond in force to racially motivated 911
calls.236

232. See e.g., TOM R. TYLER&YUEN J. Huo, TRuST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49-96 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law
Abidingness:A ProactiveModel ofSocialRegulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 365-80 (2001).
233. See Vesla Mae Weaver, Why White People Keep Calling the Cops on Black
Americans, Vox (May 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2018/5/17/17362100/
starbucks-racial-profiling-yale-airbnb-911 ("The gulf between how black America and white
America experience the police is vast.').
234. See Richardson, supranote 105, at 80.
235. Id ("For Black individuals, racial anxiety is experienced as the fear of being
victimized by police racism. ... These worries may result in Black individuals approaching
police interactions with heightened suspicion and anxiety. During their interaction, these
mutual anxieties increase the risk that officers will conduct a frisk and that force will be used
unnecessarily.").
236. See id; see also ProceduralJustice andPolice Legitimacy, CAL. COMM'N PEACE
OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, https//post.ca.gov/procedural-justice-and-police-legitimacy
(last updated Dec. 19, 2018) ("[The public's] perception about the lawfulness and legitimacy
of law enforcement are an important criterion for judging policing in a democratic society.").
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In fact, individuals in society obey the law only partially to avoid
punishment.23 7 The largest factor affecting obedience is legitimacy:
[Bly increasing respect for the law as both fair and fairly applied,
lawmakers can in fact increase voluntary compliance with the law.
...

The more an individual regard[s] legal authorities as exercising

legitimate authority, the more that individual [is] likely to obey the
law.... [T]he relationship between legitimacy and compliance is linear:
as legitimacy increases, so does compliance ... .238
Researchers have shown that the single largest determinant in
how one views the legitimacy and authority of police is the qualitative
and quantitative personal interactions one has with the police.239
'Teople tend to focus on how police treat then-the process and
interactions-rather than the final outcome of those interactions....
People who perceive that they receive 'procedural justice' are also
likely to perceive the police as legitimate and trustworthy and [thus]
are likely to comply in the future." 24
These findings help explain why people of color tend to have
greater distrust of police--hey are far more likely to have involuntary
interactions with police, and those interactions are more likely to be
adversarial, disrespectful, and violent.2 4' Thus, when civilians call 911
and summon police for illegitimate reasons, alleged suspects are less
likely to view the encounter as a legitimate exercise of police authority
and less likely to engage in perfect compliance, which itself may
unnecessarily escalate a police contact that should never have taken
place. For people of color, who may already have distrustful
perceptions of police legitimacy owing to past personal experiences or
exposure to others' stories of illegitimate policing, this reluctance to
comply may be magnified.
With each unwarranted encounter between police and a person of
color, the distrust of the affected individual grows. As recent events
have shown, these negative encounters are more likely to be broadcast

237. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation:Why Do People
Help the PoliceFight Crime in Their Communities?,6 OHIo ST. J. CRiM. L. 231, 247 (2008).
238. Capers, supra note 26, at 838-39 (footnotes omitted).
239. Perceptions of Treatment by Police: Impacts of PersonalInteractions and the
Media, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/
legitimacy/pages/perceptions.aspx.
240. Id
241. See discussionsupraPart m.A.2.
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to the world, indirectly shaping views on legitimacy and authority for
the rest of the community.2 4 2
2.

Over-Enforcement and Under-Enforcement

Problems of over- and under-enforcement can help explain why
white individuals may utilize 911 more frequently than black
individuals to report nonemergencies. Police response to these calls
also exacerbates these problems.
White people tend to experience law enforcement as helpful,
cooperative, and responsive as compared to African Americans.24 3 A
large study of white and black drivers pulled over by police showed
that "even when whites have involuntary contact with police, they
overwhelmingly experience the police as helpful, benevolent, fair, and
efficient problem solvers." 2 ' In contrast, "[n]onwhite people who try
to enlist law enforcement for help are more likely than whites to
themselves come under suspicion."2 45 Moreover, officers are more
likely to view African Americans as defiant and uncooperative, and
thus suspicious, for exercising constitutional rights such as asking
questions, refusing consent to enter or search premises, or asking
officers to leave. 246 This "mismatch in experience [creates] powerful
incentives for people of one racial group to call the police" and a
"powerful disincentive for black people to call the police in almost any
situation except when their lives depend on it" 2 47

242. See Perceptionsof D-eatment by Police, supra note 239 ("Frequent exposure to
media reports of police abuse or corruption is a strong predictor of perceptions of misconduct
and supports the belief that it is common. African-Americans who live in high-crime areas
and who regularly hear others talk about police misconduct are especially likely to believe
misconduct is common."); see also Tyler & Fagan, supra note 237, at 245-46 (2008) (showing
the effects of personal experiences with the police on survey respondents' views of police
legitimacy and performance, as well as how likely respondents would be to cooperate with the
police in the future).
243. See CHARLES R. EPp ET AL., PuLLED OVER- How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CrHzENSHIP 98-104 (2014).
244. Weaver, supra note 233; see also Epp ET AL., supra note 243 (examining racial
disparities in investigatory police stops).
245. Weaver, supranote 233.
246. See id
247. Id Moreover, recent studies have concluded that police take less seriously-and
therefore under-police--calls from predominantly black and Hispanic communities. For
example, a review of Chicago Police Department practices found that "the average time to
arrival for cals to police in nonwhite neighborhoods was twice as long as in predominantly
white neighborhoods." Id; Press Release, ACLU M., Newly-Released Data Shows City
Continues to Deny Equitable Police Services to South and West Side Neighborhoods (Mar.
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This critical imbalance leads to "over-enforcement," or excessive
action against people of color under suspicion for no legitimate reason,
and simultaneously to "under-enforcement," or inadequate action in
communities of color that need police protection. Data on overenforcement against communities of color is overwhelming. For
example, a report by retired federal and state judges studying policing
in San Francisco found significant "racial disparities regarding [San
Francisco Police Department] stops, searches, and arrests, particularly
for Black people."" In Chicago, a 2016 Police Accountability Task
Force report found that "black and Hispanic drivers were searched
approximately four times as often as white drivers." 49 Similarly, a
2015 analysis by the New York Tmes found that in Greensboro, North
Carolina, police officers "used their discretion to search black
drivers ... more than twice as often as white motorists."250
But in each of these studies, the data showed that black individuals
who were searched were far less likely to have contraband than white
individuals who were searched." Thus, this data also suggests the
"under-enforcement' of the law against white individuals engaged in
criminal activity, who appear to escape detection and arrest more
frequently than black individuals. In this sense and from an economic
efficiency standpoint, over-enforcement against one community
necessarily leads to under-enforcement against another, so long as the
over-scrutinized community does not actually engage in criminal
activity at greater rates. Studies routinely demonstrate that this is not
31, 2014), http//www.aclu-iLorg/en/press-releases/nwly-released-data-shows-city-continues
-deny-equitable-police-services-south-and.
248. S.F. Disr. ATTORNEY, REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON TRANSPARENCY,
AccouNTABILTY, AND FAIRNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMEr 28, 30 (2016), https*//sfdistrict
attomey.org/sites/default/files/Document/BRPreport.pdf (finding that "although Black
people accounted for less than 15 percent of all stops in 2015, they accounted for over 42
percent of all non-consent searches following stops").

249. POLICE ACCOUNTABILYTY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM:
RESTORING TRUST BErwEEN THE CHCAGO POLICE AND THE COMMuNTIs THEY SERVE 9
(2016), https://chicagopatf.org/p-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF FinalReport_Executive
Summary_4_13_16-l.pdf
250. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lebren, The DispruportionateRisks ofDriving
While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/usracialdisparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.htmIl ("Officers were more likely to stop black drivers for
no discernible reason. And they were more likely to use force if the driver was black, even
when they did not encounter physical resistance.").
251. See S.F. DIST. ATTORNEY, supra note 248, at 30-31; POLICE ACCOUNTABILTY
TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 9 (showing that contraband was found on white drivers twice
as often as black and Hispanic drivers); LaFraniere & Lehren, supranote 250 (remarking that
drugs and weapons were found "significantly more often when the driver was white").
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the case.252 Rather than communities of color committing crimes at
greater rates, the crime in those areas are simply detected at greater
rates because of over-enforcement.2 53 By extension, the crimes
committed in white areas or by white motorists are detected at lower
rates because of an inefficient allocation of resources to communities
and motorists of color.25
3.

Incarceration

Disproportionate incarceration rates for communities of color are
an obvious and well-documented consequence of over-policing. 25 5 But
responding to frivolous 911 calls also contributes to disproportionate
incarceration rates in two specific ways: disproportionate arrest rates
resulting from civilian "noncompliance" and from mandatory "warrant
checks."
Intuitively, one might conclude that a truly frivolous civilian
complaint would not lead to an arrest or conviction because no crime
actually occurred. But as discussed in the previous subpart, police
officers are more likely to interpret a black individual's lawful
behavior-even constitutionally protected behavior-as hostile,
adversarial, or violent. 256 Thus, not only are African Americans less
likely to comply when confronted by a police officer responding to a
frivolous 911 call, but that officer is more likely to interpret the lawful
behavior as illegal and make an unnecessary arrest.
Second, many police departments require that any officer
responding to a 911 call conduct a "warrant check" of all individuals at
the scene. These "warrant checks" are designed to find individuals
with outstanding arrest warrants for, among other things, failure to pay

252. Kim Farbota, Black Crime Rates: What Happens When Nnbers Aren't Neutrl,
HUFFINGTON POST, https//WwW.huffimgtonposcom/kim-farbota/black-crime-rates-your-st_b

8078586.html (Sept 2, 2016) (summarizing research confirming that no statistical difference
exists in actually committed crime rates between whites and blacks but that blacks are
significantly more likely to be monitored by police, arrested, convicted, and sentenced to
lengthy prison terms).
253. See id
254. See id
255. Id
256. The study reviewing Ferguson Police Department practices, for example, found
that "[o]fficers expect and demand compliance even when they lack legal authority," and "are
inclined to interpret the exercise of free-speech rights as unlawful disobedience, innocent
movements as physical threats, [and] indications of mental or physical illness as belligerence."
CIVIL RIGHTS
DEPARTMENT

DIV., U.S.

2 (2015).

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
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traffic tickets or court fees and fines associated with prior cases." The
existing disproportionate arrest and conviction rate of black men results
in a disproportionate number of arrest warrants issued against these
communities. Moreover, many of these communities have greater
poverty rates and thus are disproportionately affected by warrants
issued for failure to pay steep fees and fines.25 8 As one former police
captain observed in discussing mandatory warrant checks, "Warrants
are what happen when one community is policed at a rate that is greater
than others, making it unusual in some parts of a city to find young
black males who don't have warrants." 5 9
4.

Physical Violence

Each racially motivated 911 call creates an additional opportunity
for unwarranted police violence against a person of color. While the
same can be said for every frivolous 911 call-and indeed, any police
interaction-empirical evidence confirms that the risks to communities
of color are substantially greater. In this sense, bias-motivated callers
truly are weaponizing their fear by sending an armed officer to confront
an innocent person of color, with a greater chance that the confrontation
will end in violence.
Although no adequate federal database of fatal police shootings
exists,2 60 a study from the University of California at Davis found that
"the probability ofbeing [black, unarmed, and shot by police[] is about
3.49 times the probability of being []white, unarmed, and shot by
"1261
police[] on average.

257. See Torie Atkinson, A FineScheme. How AnicipalFinesBecome CrushingDebt
in the Shadow of the New Debtors'Prison,51 HARv. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 225-27 (2016)
(describing the disproportionate impact of "warrant checks" on communities of color).
258. Id
259. David C. Couper, Best Way to RespondtoFoolish 911 Calls-StopSendingArmed
Cops, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018), https*//www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2018/
06/27/91 1-calls-cops-policing-usaf32692002/; see also Atkinson, supranote 257, at 225-26
(noting that, in many jurisdictions where a majority of African Americans have outstanding
warrants, "police ignore[] the reasonable suspicion requirement to run as many identifications
as possible through the warrant system to identify 'offenders,' arrest them, and levy additional
fines").
260. See Mark Tran, FBI Chief 'Unacceptable' that Guardian Has Better Data on
Police Violence, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/
08/fbi-chief-says-ridiculous-guardian-washington-post-better-information-police-shootings.
261. Cody T. Ross, A Multi-Level BayesianAnalysis ofRacialBiasin PoliceShootings
at the County-Level in the United States, 2011-2014, PLOS ONE (Nov. 5, 2015), https:l
joumals.plos.org/plosone/articleid=10.1371/journal.pone.0141854.
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This disparity has no rational justification. An independent
analysis of Washington Post data on police killings found that, "when
factoring in threat level, black Americans who are fatally shot by police
are no more likely to be posing an imminent lethal threat to the officers
at the moment they are killed than white Americans fatally shot by
police."262
Disproportionate violence is not limited to fatal shootings. A
working paper by Harvard Professor Roland Fryer, Jr. found that police
officers are more likely to use their hands, push a suspect into a wall or
onto the ground, use handcuffs, draw weapons, point their weapon, and
26 3
use pepper spray or a baton when interacting with black individuals.
This study confirms findings by the Center for Policing Equity, which
found that "African-Americans are far more likely than whites and
other groups to be the victims of use of force by the police, even when
2
racial disparities in crime are taken into account." 64
This disproportionate use of force is particularly apparent with the
use of restraints. A Stanford University study of police practices in
Oakland, California, found that in a thirteen-month period, "2,890
African Americans [were] handcuffed but not arrested ... while only
193 whites were cuffed. When Oakland officers pulled over a vehicle
but didn't arrest anyone, 72 white people were handcuffed, while 1,466
2 65
African Americans were restrained."
262. See Wesley Lowery, Aren't More White People than Black People Killed by
Police? Yes, but No., WASH. PosT (July 11, 2016), https-//www.washingtonposcom/ampht
6 7
ml/news/post-nation/wp/201 /0 /1 I/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-bypolice-yes-but-no/.
263. Roland G. Fyer, Jr., An EmpiricalAnalysis ofRacialDiferences in Police Use of
Force (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2018), https//www.
nber.org/papers/w22399.pdf; see also Quoctrung Bui & Amanda Cox, Surprising New
Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use ofForcebut Not in Shootings,N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016)
https*//www.nytims.com/2016/07/12/upshot/uprsing-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-policeusef-force-but-not-in-shootings.html (discussing Fyer's study).
264. PHILLPATIBA GOFF ET AL, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE:
RACE, ARRESTS, AND POUCE USE OF FORCE (2016), http://policingequity.org/wp-contet/
uploads/2016/07/CPESoJRace-Anests-UoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf, Timothy Williais, Study
Sqpports Suspicion that Police Are More Likely to Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
osuspicion-that-polic-s-of2016), https*//www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/std-s
force-is-more-likely-for-blacks.html.
265. REBECCA C. HETEY ET AL., STANFORD Soc. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWERS TO REALWoRLD QUESTIONS, DATA FOR CHANGE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POuCE STOPS,
SEARCHES, HANDCUFFINGS, AND ARRESTS IN OAKLAND, CALF., 2013-2014 (2016), https//
stanford.app.box.com/v/Data-for-Change; Tom Jackman, Oakland Police, Stopping and
WASH. PosT (June
HandcuffingDisproportionateNumbers ofBlacks, Work to Restore Thist,
6 6
15, 2016), https-//www.washingtonpostcom/newsecim/wp201 /0 /15/oakland-policestoppig-and-handcuffing-disproportionate-numbers-of-blacks-work-terestore-trust/.
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But perhaps no study illustrates the danger of allowing civilians
to weaponize armed government agents for racially biased reasons than
a 2007 University of Chicago study comparing the abilities of police
officers and the general population to determine whether to shoot a
target that flashed before them.2 6 The targets featured a mix of armed
and unarmed black and white people.267 The researchers found that
although the officers generally set higher criterion for the decision to
shoot black targets than community members, the officers nevertheless
manifested "robust racial bias in the speed with which they made
shoot/don't shoot decisions.""
Media reports of high-profile shootings of unarmed black boys
and men preceded the increased attention to racially motivated 911
calls. The link between the two is unmistakable. Over half of all police
contacts with "suspicious" individuals occur as a result of a civilian
complaint, and many ofthe now-infamous police shootings of unarmed
civilians were initiated by a nonemergency 911 call.
Consider the case of Stephon Clark. On the night of March 18,
2018, police in Sacramento were responding to a vague 911 call about
someone breaking car windows when they spotted twenty-two-yearold Stephon Clark standing in his grandmother's backyard holding a
cell phone.26 9 Police approached Clark in the dark but did not announce
that they were law enforcement.27 0 iste
body camera footage
showed officers shouting "show me your hands!" before firing dozens
of bullets in rapid-fire succession at Clark less than twenty seconds
after arriving.2 7 1 Clark, an African-American father of two with no
criminal record, was unarmed.27 2 He had been shot twenty times.m
266. See Correll et al., supra note 107, at 1022-23.
267. Id at 1009-10.
268. Id at 1020.
269. See Frances Robles & Jose A. Del Real, Stephon Clark Was Shot 8 TmesPImaily
in His Back Family-Ordered Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/03/30/us/stephon-clark-independent-autopsyiitml.
270. Sam Levin, 'They Executed Him': Police Killing ofStephon Clark Leaves Family
Shattered GUARDLAN (Mar. 27, 2018), https/ww.theguadian.com/us-news/2018/mar/27/
stephon-clark-police-shooting-brother-interview-sacramento.
271. Maria Perez, Body-Camera Video Shows Sacramento Police Shoot and Kill
Unarmed Black Man, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2018), https*//www.newsweek.com/stephonclark-police-shootings-us-calbrnia-856175; Robles & Del Real, supra note 269. For five
minutes, no officers approached Clark or offered him medical aid, instead continuing to shout
at him to show his hands. Officers eventually handcuffed his lifeless body and uniformly
muted the audio on their cameras. See Levin, supra note 270.
272. Levin, supra note 270.
273. Id
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The tragic case of Tamir Rice provides another poignant example.
On November 22, 2014, officers responded to a 911 call reporting a
person pointing a gun in a Cleveland, Ohio, park.27 4 While the call
itself clearly was not frivolous, the caller expressly stated that the gun
275
was "probably fake" and that the individual was likely a juvenile.
However, the dispatcher did not relay either of these pieces of
information to the responding officers.2 7 6 Police officers shot twelve2 77
year-old Tamir Rice within two seconds of arriving on the scene. The
officers neither approached Tamir nor provided him an opportunity to
put his hands up.278 Officers waited four minutes before approaching
Tamir to provide medical aid, at which point they confirmed the gun
0
was a toy.27 9 Tamir died the next day.28
V.

STATE ACQUIESCENCE AND THE "WEAPON" OF RACIAL FEAR

This Part focuses on the "weapon" in the equation: the armed
police officer. In particular, it challenges legislative and judicial efforts
to immunize police officers from all but the most outrageous
misconduct by finding virtually all uses of force by officers
"objectively reasonable" and providing "qualified immunity" in the
rare instance when the use of force is deemed excessive. This failure
to provide any sort of check or deterrent mechanism against the use of
force by armed, implicitly biased officers improperly strengthens the
"weapon" in weaponized racial fear and further empowers bias274. Brandon Blackwell, TamirRice, 12-Year-Old Boy Shot Dead by ClevelandPolice
Officer, Had No Juvenile Courl Recor4 CLEvELAND.COM (Nov. 24, 2014), http*//www.
cleveland.com/metro/index.ssl2014/1 1/tamir rice_12-year-old boysho.html
275. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, 12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot
Him, N.Y. TIMes (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us/boy-12-diesafter-beig-shot-by-cleveland-police-officer.html.
276. Id
277. Id
278. Id
279. Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized Crime
News, GrandJwiesandTamir Rice, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1, 8 n.40 (2017).
280. Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old
Tamir Rice Within Seconds, WASH. PosT (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/ofcialeease-video-names-in-fatal-police-shootingof-12-year-old-cleveland-boy. A grand jury declined to indict either officer, stating that the
actions of the officers were "objectively reasonable" under the circumstances. Adamson, supra
note 279, at 12-14. This conclusion followed the recommendations of"an outside police expert
... conclud[ing] that the officer acted reasonably given the information he had." Mark
Berman, Review Says Cleveland Police Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Acted Reasonably,
2
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/ 015/
11/13/review-says-cleveland-police-officer-who-shot-tamir-rice-acted-reasonably.
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motivated individuals to act on their biases. This Part concludes with
a comparison of this near-absolute immunity for police officers and the
immunity for civilian vigilantes provided by so-called "Stand Your
Ground" laws in certain jurisdictions.
A.

Protectinga "Shoot First, Think Later" Culture: Objective
Reasonablenessand QualifiedImmunity

Police officers have long enjoyed "an immunity from scrutiny"
for using unnecessary force in encounters with civilians? The law, as
developed in state legislatures and federal courts, has affirmatively
"encouraged such favoritism."2 82
The doctrines of "objective
reasonableness" and "qualified immunity" account for much of this
protection from prosecution and liability. The law regarding use of
force and qualified immunity has evolved over the last two decades to
provide a near-blanket protection for even the most egregious,
unwarranted, and racially charged police misconduct. 8 3
1.

Use of Force and "Objective Reasonableness"

The Supreme Court first attempted to define a precise legal
standard for excessive force in Tennessee v. Garner2" In Garner, a
police officer responding to a report of a prowler observed an AfricanAmerican teenager named Edward Garner running across the backyard
of a home that had just been burglarized.2 85 When Garner began
climbing over the fence, the officer shot him in the back of the head,
fearing that if Garner made it over the fence, he would elude capture.2 8
Garner was taken to a hospital where he died on the operating table. 2 87
The Supreme Court criticized the common law rule permitting an
officer to use whatever force was necessary, including deadly force, to
effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon. 288 Rejecting the common law
281. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use ofDeadly Force: De-Escalation,
PreseizureConduct, andInperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REv. 629, 633.
282. Id
283. See Hassel, supra note 25, at 130 (highlighting the diminishing importance of
questions of fact in excessive force cases given the power of the qualified immunity defense);
see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (finding that qualified immunity protects
defendants when their actions fall on the '"azy border between excessive and acceptable force"
(quoting Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000))).
284. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
285. Id at 3.
286. Id at 4.
287. Id
288. Idat1l.
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rule, the Court held that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape
of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable." 8' The Court explained that only where an officer has
probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others, is it constitutionally reasonable
to prevent escape by using deadly force.29
But only four years after deciding Garner, the Court retreated
from its embrace of clearly defined guidelines for police use of deadly
force. In Graham, 2 91 the Court instead held that whether an officer has
unconstitutionally used excessive force would be judged by an
"objective reasonableness" standard.2 9 This vague and imprecise
standard is easily malleable and bends inexorably in favor of police
officers over injured or killed civilians.
In Graham, the Court held that "[d]etermining whether the force
used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment" involves balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights with the government's interest. 293 Acknowledging that this
balancing test "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application," 29 the Court explained that:
[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight 295
The Court explained that in conducting reasonableness balancing,
courts should apply an objective standard of reasonableness. 2 96 The
officer's actual intent or motive is irrelevant in this objective inquiry.29 7
This portion of the holding-that an objective standard would now
govern police use of force cases-was a "breakthrough." 298 Civil rights
advocates believed that imposing an objective standard and absolving

-

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id
Id at 11-12.
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Id at 388, 397 (emphasis added).

293.

M at 396.

294. Id (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979)).
295. Id

296. M at 388.
297. M at 395.
298. More Perfect: Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, WNYC STuDios (Nov. 30,

2017), https-//www.wnycstudios.org/story/radio
-man.

ore-pefect-mr-grham-reasonable
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the injured victim from having to prove malicious intent on the part of
the officer would give greater protections to civilians against police
abuses.2 9 9
But elsewhere in the opinion, the Court defined "reasonableness"
in unmistakably deferential, officer-friendly terms:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight ... The calculus of reasonableness must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments-4n circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation."
Several aspects of the "objective reasonableness" test, as
articulated in Graham and expanded by lower courts, pose problems
for plaintiffs pursuing excessive force claims. First, if there is evidence
that an officer was "forced to make [a] split-second judgement[],"
juries are allowed to only consider what a reasonable officer would
have done in that "split-second," even if there is earlier information that
would make the use of force appear unreasonable.o' Rather than
considering what a reasonable officer would do in general, taking into
account all of the information the officer on the scene had prior to the
use of force and the calculations a reasonable officer would have made
with that information, courts and juries may focus on what a reasonable
officer would have done in that "split-second."3 02 This very narrow
temporal scope defeats the majority of use of force claims."o3
299. Id
300. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that an
officer does not have to be correct in his assessment of the need to use force. "The Fourth
Amendment is not violated merely because an officer was mistaken, as long as his mistake was
reasonable." Lee, supra note 281, at 645.
301. Graha, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see More Perfect: Mr. Grham and the Reasonable
Man, supra note 298 (describing how this "split-second" view has led many juries to find that
officers' conduct was reasonable).
302. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Further, events taking place prior to the use of force
may break the chain of causation and render prior unreasonable actions irrelevant. For
example, in City ofLos Angeles v. Mendez, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's "provocation
rule," which permitted excessive force claims when an officer unreasonably provoked a violent
confrontation, even though the use of force during the confrontation was reasonable. 137 S.
Ct. 1539, 1546-47 (2017). The Court explained that whether the officers acted unreasonably
by entering the premises without a warrant was irrelevant as long as the subsequent use of force
was reasonable. Id at 1545.
303. See More Perfect: Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, supra note 298
(explaining how police officers view the objective reasonableness standard, which was
originally believed to be a "breakthrough" in the law, as their First Amendment right).
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"

A second problem, related to this deference, is that officer
testimony is routinely given greater inherent credibility by courts and
juries than conflicting testimony from the plaintiff-victim.3 " This
deference is particularly problematic given recent studies confirming
the widespread practice of police officers committing perjury by
manufacturing circumstances to justify their behavior, or worse, hiding
their own explicit racial motivations in using force. A commission
studying the New York Police Department found that perjury was "so
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word:
'testilying."' 305 But "[d]espite the common knowledge that law
enforcement perjury occurs, prosecutions are extremely rare."'
Indeed, except in cases of lethal force or egregious displays of abuse,
"law enforcement officers [continue to] engage in otherwise
sanctionable and criminal behavior usually without fear of
consequences."
Third, implicit racial stereotypes can affect perceptions of
whether an officer's use of force was reasonable. As discussed above,
African Americans are often associated with aggression, violence, and
This reality offers two opportunities for racist
criminality."
stereotypes to adversely affect the "reasonableness" inquiry: first, when
determining whether the officer was "reasonable" in acting on his
perceptions, including the race of the individual; and second, when
factfinders act on their own implicit racial biases in determining
whether it would be "reasonable" to use force in a circumstance
involving a particular racial minority.
While race cannot explicitly be considered a legitimate factor in
the reasonableness analysis, implicit bias inevitably affects factfinding
analyses. Researchers studying community members' perceptions
about the reasonableness of police use of force found that "cultural
304. See Capers,supra note 26, at 867-68; Hassel, supranote 25, at 125.
305. Capers, supra note 26, at 836 (quoting MILTON MOLUEN ET AL., COMM'N TO
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF PoucE CORRUPTION AND THE ANrI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES
OF THE POLiCE DEP'T, CITY OF N.Y., COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994)).

306. Id at 837.
307. Kate Levine, How We Prosecutethe Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 763 n.103 (2016)
(quoting Capers, supranote 26, at 837).
308. See discussion supraPart IILA.2.
309. See Cynthia Lee, MakingRace Salient: Thayvon Martinand ImplicitBias in aNot
Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555, 1555 (2013); Justin D. Levinson et aL,
Devaluing Death:An EmpiricalStudy ofImplicit RacialBias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six
Death PenaltyStates, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 523-45 (2014) (discussing pervasive racial bias
on juries).
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values influenced the way individuals perceived the reasonableness of
the officer's actions.""o This fact alone suggested to the researchers
that "it was inappropriate for a case involving questions regarding the
reasonableness of an officer's use of deadly force to be adjudicated on
a motion for summary judgment as opposed to a jury trial."" But the
vast majority of civil use of force trials end at summary judgment in
favor of the officer and the majority of criminal excessive force cases
end with a grand jury failing to indict
2.

Qualified Immunity

Even if a judge finds sufficient evidence that an officer used
excessive force, a second layer of protection-qualified immunityalmost always shields officers from prosecution and liability. What
first developed as a doctrine designed to balance the rights of
individuals to be free from government abuse with the need to protect
government actors from frivolous lawsuits "has metastasized into an
almost absolute defense to all but the most outrageous conduct. The
values of deterrence of unlawful behavior and compensation for civil
rights victims have been overshadowed by the desire to protect
government agents, particularly police officers, from almost all claims
against them." 312
Qualified immunity initially was similar to the good faith defense
available under common law, which included a subjective
component.313 The Supreme Court eliminated the subjective element
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,314 holding that "government officials ...
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."" The Court
later clarified in Ashcroft v. Al-Kiddl' that qualified immunity shields
federal and state officials from money damages unless the plaintiff can
prove "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
310. Lee, supra note 281, at 649 (citing Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive llibemism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 838 (2009)).
311. Id at 649-50 (citing Kahan et al., stpranote 310, at 881).
312. Hassel, supranote 25, at 118.
313. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,555-56 (1967) (validating officers' claims "that
they should not be liable if they acted in good faith... in making an arrest" because the doctrine
of qualified immunity includes "the defense of good faith").
314. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
315. Id at 818.
316. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
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and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the
challenged conduct""
By design, qualified immunity provides a broad and generally
successful defense to most civil rights claims. As the Court has
explained, qualified immunity ensures that only "the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" will be found
liable for misconduct.1 8 Indeed, even when courts find that officers
violated the "objective reasonableness" test under Graham by using
excessive force, they still shield officers from liability if the officer
reasonably believed that no "clearly established" right existed at the
time.31 ' As one scholar observed in describing this two-layered level
of officer protection:
When these two standards [objective reasonableness and qualified
immunity] are both operating, a court must first determine whether a
defendant's actions are objectively reasonable. Then, assuming that the
actions were not objectively reasonable, the court must determine
whether it was nonetheless objectively reasonable for the defendant to
have believed his actions were objectively reasonable.3 20
As a result of this multilayered system of protection for police
abuse, "[q]ualified immunity has moved closer to a system of absolute
immunity for most defendants, resulting in a finding of liability for only
the most extreme and most shocking misuses of police power." 3 21
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this reality in the 2015 Mullenix v.
Luna decision. 3 1 In that case, Israel Leija, Jr., a twenty-four-year-old
Latino male, led police on a high-speed chase after an officer
approached his car and informed him that he was under arrest 32 3

Officer Mullenixjoined the effort to catch Leija and suggested shooting
at Leija's car to disable it, even though spike strips had already been
317. Id at 735 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); see also Hassel, supra note 25, at
123-24 ("The objective qualified immunity standard was seen to represent the proper balance
between conflicting interests: the interest in providing compensation for, and deterring
unconstitutional conduct against the need to protect against frivolous lawsuits and to encourage
vigorous enforcement of the law.").
318. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
319. Hassel, supranote 25, at 119.
320. Id at 125.
321. Id at 124; see also Nicholas T. Davis & Philip B. Davis, QuakfiedImunity and
Excessive Force:A GreaterorLesser Role for Juries?,47 N.M. L. REv. 291, 291 (2017) ("In
the past thirty-five years the largest roadblock in any viable civil rights case involving
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution has been the doctrine of
qualified immunity.").
322. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
323. Id at 306.
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placed on the road to disable the vehicle.3 24 Approximately three
minutes after Officer Mullenix exited his vehicle, he spotted Leija's
vehicle6 and fired six shots at it325 Four of the six shots hit Leija, killing
32

bun

Leija's estate sued Officer Mullenix and successfully defeated a
motion for summary judgment, with the district court finding genuine
issues of fact regarding whether the officer acted recklessly or
objectively.327 The United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit
went further, concluding that Mullenix acted objectively unreasonably
because "there was no threat to innocent bystanders ... and the officer
did not make a split-second decision to shoot." 328 The court continued
that, on these facts, qualified immunity could not protect the officer.32 9
The Supreme Court reversed? 30 Without deciding whether
Officer Mullenix acted unreasonably in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court found that it could not conclude that Mullenix
violated clearly established law.
Justice Sotomayor, the sole Justice to dissent from the Court's
ruling, blamed the Court for supporting a "shoot first, think later"
culture of policing.33 2 She noted that when Officer Mullenix
confronted his supervisor after the shooting, his first words were
"How's that for proactive?"-referencing an earlier counseling session
in which his supervisor had suggested Mullenix was not enterprising
enough.33 Justice Sotomayor continued:

[The comment seems to me revealing ofthe culture this Court's decision
supports when it calls it reasonable ...

to use deadly force for no

discernible gain and over a supervisor's express order to "stand by." By

324. Id Officer Mullenix asked the dispatcher to inform his supervisor of his plan and
to ask the supervisor if he thought Mullenix should shoot at Leija's car. Leija's estate claimed
that Officer Mullenix heard his supervisor telling him to stand by and wait to see if the spike
strips set in place by the other officers would disable Leija's vehicle when it reached a particular
overpass. Id at 306-07.
325. M at 307.
326. Id
327. Id
328. Lee, supra note 281, at 651.
329. Mullinex, 136 S. Ct. at 308.
330. Id
331. Id at 309-11 (discussing the "hazy legal backdrop" behind the excessive force
claim but declining to resolve the Fourth Amendment issue because of the existence of a viable
qualified immunity claim).
332. Id at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
333. Id
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sanctioning a "shoot first, think later" approach to policing, the Court
renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow. 3 34

In 2017, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in another officer

shooting case dismissed at summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity,3 Justice Sotomayor highlighted the factual inconsistencies
in the record and described the Court's continued willingness to
prioritize an officer's right to use force over the right to be free from
unnecessary police violence:
[This decision] continues a disturbing trend regarding the use of this
Court's resources. We have not hesitated to summarily reverse courts for
wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity in cases
involving the use of force. But we rarely intervene where courts wrongly
afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases. The
erroneous grant of summary judgment in qualified-immunity cases
imposes no less harm on "society as a whole," than does the erroneous
denial of summary judgment in such cases.
Justice Sotomayor's dissent puts a fine point on the Court's role

in protecting and sanctioning police violence. Given the current state
of the law, the "weapon" in weaponized racial fear-the armed police
officer-operates with virtual impunity.
B.

ProtectingCivilian Vigilantism: Stand Your GroundLaws

No trend better encapsulates the state's increasing acquiescence
to civilian weaponization of racial fear than so-called "Stand Your
Ground" laws. These laws remove any duty to retreat when a person

feels threatened and permit the use of deadly force in public if the
person reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm. 33 Numerous studies show that the enforcement of

Stand Your Ground laws has a markedly disproportionate impact on
communities of color,338 and many legal scholars have criticized them
and called for their repeal.339 While Stand Your Ground laws are not
334. Id
335. Salazar-Limon v. City of Hous., 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017).
336. Id at 1282-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting City of S.F.
v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)).
337. See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate:Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal
Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 962 (2014).
338. AM. BAR Ass'N, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONs

10-12 (2015), https*//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/

abaimages/diversity/SYGReportBookpdf (citing data from four nationwide surveys).
339. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 337; see also Elizabeth Megale, A Callfor Change:
A Contextual-ConfigurativeAnalysis ofFlorida's "Stand Your Ground" Laws, 68 U. MIAMI
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the focus of this Article, no discussion of weaponized racial fear would
be complete without a brief consideration of the state's protection for
bias-motivated civilian vigilantes who commit homicides deemed
'justified" by the statutes.
1.

The Disproportionate Racial Impact of Stand Your Ground

Stand Your Ground laws fly in the face of the traditional selfdefense doctrine, posing a serious threat to public safety "by
encouraging armed vigilantism."o Under traditional self-defense law,
a person can use force to defend themselves anywhere, but when they
are outside their home they cannot use force likely to kill or seriously
injure someone if there is a safe way to avoid doing so.341 This
traditional law respects both a person's right to self-defense and the
sanctity of human life by requiring someone to avoid taking a life if a
clear and safe alternative exists.342
The centuries-old exception to this rule-the castle doctrineallows a person inside their home to defend themselves with force even
if they could have safely walked away." Stand Your Ground laws
radically upend both the duty to retreat and the castle doctrine by
allowing people to shoot to kill in public even if a clear and safe
alternative exists. At least thirty-three jurisdictions have some version
of Stand Your Ground, either through legislative enactment or judicial
order.344

L. REv. 1051, 1054-55 (2014) (analyzing the "imbalance of power and conflict in values" of
Florida's Stand Your Ground law and calling for repeal); Jacob Wolf, Note, On Death's
Doorstep: The Racially StratifiedImpact of the Aichigan Self-Defiense Act and Why RaceCentricAdvocacyIs Not the Answer, 5 CoLUM. J. RACE & L. 53, 55-62 (2014) (discussing the
history of Michigan's Self-Defense Act and addressing calls for repeal).
340.

The InherentDangerofStand Your GroundLaws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY

(Feb. 8, 2019), https//everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-stand-your-ground/.
341. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A CriticalLook at Stand Your GroundLaws,
67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 827, 833, 846 (2013) (analyzing the difference between "Stand Your
Ground [and] a more traditional self-defense law"); Cynthia V. Ward, "Stand Your Ground"
and Self-Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 92-100 (2015) (discussing the historical and legal
development of the traditional self-defense rule in criminal law).
342. See "Stand Your Ground"Laws, GIFFomRs L. CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/
gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
343. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and SelfDefense, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 667 (2003) ("In the case of defense of habitation, the Castle
Doctrine allows the resident to stand ground and use deadly force against the intruder to protect
the sanctity of the home from the attempted atrocious felony because the duty to retreat would
be incompatible with the goal of preventing the commission of the felony.").
344. "Stand Your Ground"Laws, supra note 342.
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It is indisputable that these laws "are associated with higher rates
of homicides.""' A 2012 study by researchers at Texas A&M
University found that Stand Your Ground jurisdictions saw a
significant increase in homicide rates, with an average of more than
600 additional homicides per year.' In Florida, homicides determined
to be "justified" tripled in the years following passage of its Stand Your
Ground statute?.7
Moreover, Stand Your Ground laws have a clear disproportionate
impact on communities of color.' In advocating for the repeal of
Stand Your Ground laws, the advocacy group Everytown for Gun
Safety noted that "[w]hen white shooters kill black victims, the
resulting homicides are deemed justifiable 11 times more frequently
than when the shooter is Black and the victim is white." 9 Therefore,
the death of a minority individual in a Stand Your Ground case is less
than "half as likely to result in a conviction, compared to cases with
white victims."s 0 Similarly the American Bar Association has
highlighted that Stand Your Ground laws exacerbate existing racial
tensions and "perpetuate[] a foolish bravado of those who feel a bold
security when they have a gun in their hand, and it exonerates an
arrogance and/or ignorance." 5s
Researchers have also shown that implicit bias and cultural
misperceptions of racial minorities as "more violent" or "more
aggressive" exacerbate the disproportionate impact of Stand Your
Ground laws. 35 2 Many scholars have noted the importance of race and

racial stereotypes as public policy considerations when considering
whether to repeal Stand Your Ground laws, explaining that cross-racial
and cross-cultural fears and perceptions can unfairly impact the
reasonableness prong in a justifiable homicide analysis. 3 53
345. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 338, at 11-12. Many of the Stand Your Ground laws
are form legislation drafted by the American Exchange Council (ALEC) and the National Rifle
Association. Megale, supra note 339, at 1079-84.
346. AM. BAR Ass'N, supranote 338, at 6.
347. See id at 13.
348. Id at 24-26.
349. The InherentDangerofStand Your GroundLaws, supranote 340.
350. Id
351. AM. BAR Ass'N, supranote 338, at 24 (quoting Rev. Leonard Leach, Mt Hebron
Missionary Baptist Church).
352. Id
353. See id ('M]inority communities are deathly afraid that Stand Your Ground law
sits side-by-side with racial profiling; the ticket to vigilante justice." (quoting Ed Shohat, a
criminal defense attorney and member of the Miami-Dade County Community Relations
Board)); sources cited supranotes 341-344.

2019]
2.

WEAPONIZED RACIAL FEAR

987

Misplaced Burdens of Proof

A disturbing expansion of protection for vigilantes under Stand
Your Ground laws highlights the willful blindness of state legislatures
to weaponized racial fear. This most recent expansion comes in the
form of shifting burdens of proof. While self-defense traditionally has
been viewed as an affirmative defense to be raised by a criminal
defendant in a homicide case," Florida and other states have recently
amended their Stand Your Ground laws to shift the burden of proof
onto prosecutors to demonstrate in pretrial hearings that a killing was
not justified under a Stand Your Ground law."' Even more troubling,
some jurisdictions have affirmatively removed discretion from police
officers responding to a Stand Your Ground homicide, preventing by
statute the ability of law enforcement to even arrest killers if it appears
possible that the killing was justified under Stand Your Ground laws.35 6
A recent case from Florida illustrates the perverse effect of these
shifting burdens. On July 19, 2018, Britany Jacobs pulled into the
handicapped parking spot at a convenience store in Clearwater, Florida,
while her boyfriend, Markeis McGlockton, and their five-year-old son
went inside to buy some snacks." Jacobs stayed in the car.' Jacobs,
McGlockton, and their child were all African Americans.`" After
McGlockton went inside, Michael Drejka approached the car and
began lecturing Jacobs about parking in a handicapped space without
the required decal.' When McGlockton came out of the store and saw
Drejka harassing his girlfriend, he shoved Drejka to the ground.'
Surveillance footage captured what happened next. Drejka, a

354. Katelyn E. Keegan, Note, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospectsfor
Gender-Neutral Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS LJ. 259, 267 (2013)
("Under traditional self-defense law, a defendant carries the burden of showing that he used
force out of necessity to avoid an imminent attack by an aggressor.").
355. Jim Saunders, FloridaAppeals Court Upholds 'Stand Your Ground' Changes,
TALIAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (May 14, 2018), https/A/www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/05/
14/stand-your-ground-law-florida-court-upholds-change-burden-proof/6080460027 ("Before
the change was passed last year, the Florida Supreme Court had said defendants had the burden
of proof in pre-trial hearings to show they should be shielded from prosecution.").
356. SeeFLA.STAT. § 776.013 (2018).
357. Julia Jacobs, 'StandYour Ground'Citedby FloridaSheriff Who Declinedto Arrest
Suspect in Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/
florida-stand-your-groundlhtml.
358. Id
359. Id
360. Id
361. Seeid
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Caucasian male with a concealed carry permit, pulled out a handgun
and shot and killed McGlockton as McGlockton was backing away.362
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri responded to the scene but made no arrest,
claiming that Florida's Stand Your Ground amendments prevented him
from doing so."' After several weeks of investigation, prosecutors
eventually arrested Drejka and charged him with manslaughter.3' At
the time of writing, Drejka was awaiting a pretrial hearing before a
judge, at which point another recent amendment to Florida's Stand
Your Ground law will become critical: the affirmative requirement that
prosecutors prove Drejka is not immune from prosecution under Stand
Your Ground.65 Unlike the case of George Zimmerman in 2012, who
had to raise self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial under
Florida's then-existing Stand Your Ground statute, 3" Florida's
legislature in 2017 further insulated killers from prosecution by
allowing a judge to dismiss the case before trial unless the prosecution
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the immunity does not
qualify: "In a criminal prosecution, once a prima facie claim of selfdefense immunity from criminal prosecution has been raised by the
defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the
immunity from criminal prosecution ... ."367 This amendment
contradicts well-settled criminal law doctrine that affirmative defenses
are raised at trial before ajury. By placing the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence on the prosecution prior to trial to rebut an
affirmative defense, Florida has made an explicit decision to protect
and shield civilian vigilantes despite the clear and unequivocal
evidence that these laws provide protections for racially motivated
killings and disproportionately impact communities of color. Similar
legislation has been passed in other states.'"
362. Id.
363. See id
364. Darran Simon, Manslaughter Defendant in 'Stand Your Ground' Case Said He
Felt Scared in Altercation, CNN (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/03/us/
michael-drejka-stand-your-gromund-jailhouse-interview/index.htnL
365. Id
366. See Josephine Ross, Cops on Trial: Did Fourth Amendment Case Law Help
George Zimmerman's Claim of Set-Defense?, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1, 10 (2016).
367. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(4) (2018).
368. See, e.g., McNeely v. State, 422 P.3d 1272, 1281 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) ("The
Oklahoma Legislature amended the Stand Your Ground statute to make clear that it includes a
right to immunity, distinguishing it from a traditional self-defense claim. On its face,
'immunity' means that there will be no further prosecution.").
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State-Sponsored Weaponization

The result of these changes to Stand Your Ground laws, when
combined with the requirements and immunities described in Part V.B,
is a perverse system of state-sponsored incentives that all but
encourages weaponizing racial fear by biased civilians. In particular,
(1)

Civilians are allowed to call 911 for frivolous, racially motivated
reasons with virtual impunity.
(2) Police officers are required to respond to all 911 calls, even
frivolous calls clearly motivated by race.
(3) When responding to these calls, police officers are authorized to
use any amount of force and are immunized from discipline or
prosecution if they use excessive force.
(4) Civilians are permitted to stand their ground and not walk away
from confrontation, even if a clear and safe path of retreat exists
and may kill other unarmedcivilians if they feel threatened.
(5) When responding to these homicides, police officers are
prevented from making arrests if the homicides even plausibly fit
within this expanded definition of self-defense, regardless of
whether facts indicate a clear racial motive.
(6) If an arrest is made, prosecutors must affirmatively prove in
pretrial hearings that the killing was not justified by a Stand Your
Ground law, rather than putting the onus on the defendant to raise
the affirmative defense at trial.
When placed side by side, this complex web of requirements,
immunizing doctrines, and burdens of proof facilitates the civilian
weaponization of racial fear, all with the support of state legislatures
and armed police officers. While each of the incentives, individually,
may serve a different underlying policy purpose, they collectively point
towards the protection of racially motivated civilians who summon the
official criminal justice apparatus to reinforce their racial fear.
VI. A BALANCED APPROACH TO THE RAcIAL FEAR DtTENTE
Implicit racial bias is pervasive, permanent, and deadly. Attempts
to remedy these biases are fundamentally flawed. The risk that these
pernicious biases will lead to unnecessary use of force by officers
responding to racially motivated 911 calls is significant. Thus, rather
than attempting to improve the quality ofpolice contacts with civilians,
this Part offers a balanced approach to reducing the quantity of
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unnecessary police interactions, primarily those initiated by frivolous
911 calls.
A.

Existing Laws Regarding911 Misuse andAbuse

Most jurisdictions impose some form of liability for frivolous
misuse of the 911 system.3 69 Typically these statutes criminalize
behavior such as dialing 911 to make a false report or nonemergency
request, preventing another person from making a 911 call, or dialing
911 to relay a prerecorded message. 37 0 But many of these jurisdictions
only impose modest fines after multiple documented instances of
abuse.371 Moreover, many states are unable to meaningfully implement
the laws in place given the decentralized regional nature of 911 call
centers, lack of information shared between dispatchers, and lack of
knowledge regarding the identities of the callers themselves. 37' These
laws do little to deter frivolous conduct, as demonstrated by the high
volume of abusive 911 calls and comparatively few enforcement
measures taken in response.37 3
The most common legislation addressing 911 abuse are so-called
"false alarm" laws, which only punish those who use 911 to report a
false alarm. 374 These laws only punish one narrow, very specific type
of 911 abuse and do nothing to deter the vast majority of nonemergency
calls, including racially motivated calls.
Other state laws cover a broader range of 911 abuse but impose
heightened, subjective requirements, rendering enforcement virtually
impossible. Massachusetts, for instance, makes it a misdemeanor to
"maliciously" call 911 but requires a finding that the caller acted with
a specific intent to harm another person.375 Other states, including
California and Tennessee, use unhelpful, broad language to make it a
369. See, e.g., Eastman, supranote 14, at 490.
370.. VERONICA ROSE, OFFICEOF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCII, INFORMATION ON9-1-1 LAWS

(2006), https*//www.cga.ctgov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0118.htm (analyzing 911 abuse laws in
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island).
371. See, e.g., id
372. See Weaver, supranote 233.
373. Eastman, supa note 14, at 492.
374. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-9(a) (2015) ("A person commits the crime of false
reporting to law enforcement authorities if he knowingly makes a false report ... .");HAw.
REv. STAT. § 710-1014.5(lXa) (2014) ("A person commits the offense of misuse of 911
emergency telephone service if the person ... [k]nowingly causes a false alarm . .. ."); IND.
CODE § 35-44.1-2-3(d) (2018) ("A person who ... gives a false report of the commission of a
crime ... commits false informing, a Class B misdemeanor").
375. MAss. GEN. LAWs. ANN. ch. 269, § 14B (2008).
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misdemeanor to call 911 for "any reason other than because of an
emergency." 7 6 Individual Louisiana parishes also prohibit calls unless
there is "a legitimate and justified purpose for the presence of police,
fire, or emergency medical personnel."'" These statutes help by
clearly covering the "broken toilet" 911 call37 but are too vague to
meaningfully address racially biased claims of criminal activity.
Furthermore, some states only impose liability for the second
instance of documented abuse, with fines and jail time increasing with
each subsequent violation.379 But these laws also prove unenforceable,
as 911 call centers are managed regionally, not by state, and the various
call centers within each state do not typically have the infrastructure,
resources, or time to regularly communicate and cross-rference
records of frivolous calls. 8 o For example, a California caller could
make frivolous calls in rapid succession to San Diego, Los Angeles,
Sacramento, and Oakland with little chance of facing liability for their
"second-time" offense.
Oregon has perhaps the most robust, carefully tailored 911 abuse
legislation, making it a misdemeanor to call 911 "for a purpose other
than to report a situation that the person reasonably believes requires
prompt service in order to preserve human life or property." 1 This
connection to immediacy and preservation of life and property
helpfully eliminates calls for golfing too slowly or failing to make a
purchase in a coffee shop. This statute provides a useful starting point
but may not do enough to address and deter racially motivated 911
calls.
It is clear that reducing the epidemic of 911 misuse and abuse
choking the emergency response system requires a more robust,
coherent, and enforceable deterrent mechanism. That deterrent and
punishment mechanism becomes all the more necessary in the context
of racially motivated 911 calls, where the deleterious impacts to human
376. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653y(a) (West 2010 & 2019 Supp.) ("A person who
knowingly allows the use or who uses the 911 emergency system for any reason other than
because of an emergency is guilty of an infraction . . . ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-86-316(a)
(2015) ("Contacting 911 for some purpose other than to report an emergency . .. is a Class C
misdemeanor.").
377. TANGIPAHOA PARISH, LA., CODE OF ORDNANCEs § 16-10(2018).
378. See supra text accompanying note 157.
379. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 653y(aXl)-(2) ("For a first violation, a written
warning shall be issued.... For a second or subsequent violation, a citation may be issued by
the public safety entity originally receiving the telephone call...").
380. See Eastman, supra note 14, at 493.
381. OR.REV.STAT. § 165.570(a) (2017).
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dignity, the corrosive impact on community trust, and the potentially
lethal consequences require a more serious deterrent response.382
B.

Frivolous Calls andFrivolousLawsuits: Bormwingfrom the
Anti-SLAPP Experience

As a result of the need to do something to deter 911 abuse, an
increasing chorus of commentators and legislators have argued for zero
tolerance policies with harsh criminal penalties or costly civil liability
for a single nonemergency call.' Some point to the fact that "[i]t is a
crime to file a false police report. When places of public
accommodation enlist the police to remove people based on race, the
owners and managers should be investigated and prosecuted for filing
false police reports."" New Jersey once "proposed legislation to apply
a criminal penalty to someone who 'knowingly provides false
information to a law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate
another because of race."'3 8 5 More recently, in August 2018, New York
State Senator Jesse Hamilton proposed legislation making racially
motivated 911 calls a hate crime after a white woman called police on
him for "campaigning while black" in her neighborhood.8 Others
have suggested that targeted individuals could use tort law, in particular
defamation, malicious prosecution, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, to hold 911 abusers accountable.8
Calls for civil or criminal liability for abusing emergency
responses systems are understandable, but one must carefully balance
the desire to reduce frivolous and race-based 911 calls against the
potentially chilling effect harsh penalties may have on people using 911
for legitimate purposes. While many of the intentional 911 calls
described in this Article qualify on their face as true "nonemergency"
382. See Patton & Farley, supm note 4 ("Right now, calling 911 on innocent black
people is a costless form of indulgence in racialized fear-or worse, racist amusement. But
lawsuits and publicity might make callers think twice and decrease the danger of false arrest
and death.").
383. See id
384. Id
385. Weaver, supra note 233.
386. Madeleine Thompson, NY. Bill Would Outlaw Racially Biased 911 Calls, PHILA.
TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2018), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/n-y-bill-would-outlaw-racially-biased
-calls/article 8aef8926-e27b-5052-96ad-aOb76341a487.htmL
387. Patton & Farley, supra note 4 ("In some cases, lawsuits could be filed for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Many state and municipal laws protect civil rights
better than their federal equivalents; suits could be brought under these laws in some cases,
too.").
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calls, others present closer questions, at least for the untrained civilian
eye. The legal system cannot, and should not, expect civilians to
become trained experts in criminal behavior, discerning and
distinguishing suspicious and innocent conduct from suspicious and
possibly criminal conduct. Indeed, police officers-the trained experts
who are expected to make such distinctions-are only legally required
to determine that conduct is reasonably suspicious of criminal activity
before initiating an investigative stop.' This low standard falls far
below probable cause or preponderance of the evidence and does not
eliminate the possibility of stopping individuals engaged solely in
innocent conduct.3 89

A middle ground exists between imposing no liability for the most
egregious, race-based 911 abuses and harsh criminal sanction for a
single, "innocent" nonemergency call. A careful balance must be
struck between the compelling need to reduce 911 misuse and the
weaponization of racial fear on the one hand, and the equally
compelling need to provide free and open access to emergency
response systems for the safety of the community on the other.
This Article suggests an innovative solution to frivolous 911 calls
that borrows from a legal solution to frivolous lawsuits: the antiSLAPP motion. A SLAPP suit is a lawsuit that is intended to censor,
intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal
defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition. Much like the
bias-motivated 911 caller who abuses scarce law enforcement
resources for improper intimidation purposes, a SLAPP plaintiff abuses
scarce judicial resources for improper intimidation purposes.
What follows is a brief introduction to the evolution of SLAPP
suits and anti-SLAPP legislation and a discussion highlighting the close
analogical fit between SLAPP suits and frivolous 911 calls. This
discussion previews the introduction of model legislation to deter and
reduce the impact of race-based 911 calls.
1.

SLAPP Suits and Anti-SLAPP Legislation

While not a new phenomenon, the use of SLAPP suits are on the
rise.?" The broadly accepted definition of a "SLAPP suit" includes the

388. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
389. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,277 (2002).
390. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16(a) (2018) ("The Legislature finds and
declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
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following four elements: "(1) a civil complaint or counterclaim ... ;
(2) filed against nongovernmental individuals and/or groups;
(3) because of their communication to a government body, official, or
the electorate; (4) on an issue of some public interest or concern." 3 9 1
The purpose of a SLAPP suit is to intimidate or retaliate against
those who use traditional interactions with the government to oppose
the SLAPP plaintiff's plans or purposes.3" The objective of a SLAPP
suit is to quell opposition by fear of large recoveries and legal costs, by
diverting energy and resources into defending the lawsuit, and by
transforming the debate from a political one into a judicial one. 9
Usually, the SLAPP plaintiff has greater financial resources than their
target, making. their pursuit of frivolous litigation all the more
In practice, SLAPP suits range from multinational
effective.'
corporations suing environmental advocacy groups for intentional
interference with contractual relations to small businesses suing online
reviewers for defamation."'
SLAPP suits ultimately work by chilling the right of free
expression and free access to government.3' This intimidation, and the
personal cost and psychological trauma to victims of the SLAPP
technique, is itself a matter of concern, as is anything that deters
citizens from participating in or accessing the resources of government
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.").
391. Braun, supranote 28, at 969 (citing George W. Pring, SLAPMs: StrategicLawsuits
Against Public Participation,7 PACE ENVTLL. REv. 3, 8 (1989)).
392. Id.
393. Id; see also PRING & CANAN, supranote 28, at 212 ('The suits are an attempt to
'privatize' public debate: a unilateral initiative by one side to transform a public, political
dispute into a private, legalistic adjudication, shifting both forum and issues to disadvantage
the opposition.").
394. Bruce E.H Johnson & Sarah IC Duran, A View from the First Amendment
Trenches: Washington State's New Protectionsfor Public Discourse and Democracy, 87
WASH. L. REv. 495, 501 (2012).
395. See, eg., Meagan Flynn, Law Firm's Lawsuit Against Student over Bad Yelp
Review Backires Badly, Hous. PRESS (Nov. 30,2016), https-//wwwhoustonpress.com/news/
(describing
law-fms-lawsuit-against-student-over-bad-yelp-review-backfires-badly-8986863
a lawsuit brought by a law firm against a former client for a bad Yelp review); Peter Hayes,
Green Groups: Suits to Silence Them on the Rise, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 14, 2017), https//
www.bna.com/green-groups-suits-n57982086728/ (summarizing a thirty million dollar
defamation suit brought by a coal company against an environmental group for Facebook posts
about coal ash waste).
396. Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price ofSpeaking Out, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 4849 ("These things work.... Citizens see a million-dollar lawsuit and they just want to go run
and hide." (quoting attorney Mark A. Chertok, who successfully defeated a high-profile
SLAPP action against environmental groups)).

2019]

WEAPONIZED RACIAL FEAR

995

"[M]ore fundamentally, the use of wealth to dominate access to
government is deeply subversive. All of these factors together make
the SLAPP suit a dangerously corrupting influence in our society."'"
But targeting the problems posed by SLAPP suits is a complicated
endeavor that requires careful balancing of interests. "In the absence
of a statutory method of weeding out SLAPP suits before the damage
is done, courts are obliged to take the allegations of SLAPP filers as
seriously as they would those of any other plaintiff."' And states
cannot simply ban SLAPP suits through legislation because on the
surface these suits are legitimate actions and anything other than a
"subtle inquiry ... to identify them" risks barring a litigant's legitimate
right to access the courts.?*
Despite the difficulty of finding the right balance between
deterring frivolous suits and protecting access to the courts, a majority
of states have attempted to strike that balance by passing anti-SLAPP
legislation.' The exact contours of each state's laws differ, but the
broad mechanisms remain the same. Anti-SLAPP laws "focus on the
swift and efficient dismissal of frivolous lawsuits against protected
activity and emphasize subjecting the SLAPPed party to as little time
in court as possible. These statutes thus force plaintiffs to take a harder
look at litigation by both deterring meritless claims and hastening their
resolution.'"' A special motion to strike is a central feature of antiSLAPP legislation, allowing a defendant to defeat a lawsuit if he can
"show that the claim is based on an action involving public
participation, petitioning, or free speech covered by the statute."
2.

SLAPP Suits and 911 Calls

While it may seem strange to compare SLAPP suits and frivolous
911 calls, the analogy fits remarkably well, considering (1) the motives
of SLAPP plaintiffs and biased 911 callers, (2) the object and effect of
SLAPP suits and frivolous 911 calls, (3) the problems in detection and
397. Braun, supra note 28, at 972.
398. Id at 971.

399. Id at 972-73 ("Constitutional guarantees of access to government and trial by jury
must be respected; to brush these guarantees aside even for the most benevolent purposes
would (even if the courts permitted it) be more dangerous than the evil the remedy sought to
correct.").
400. See Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 865 (Wash. 2015) (en banc).
401. Benjamin Ernst, Fighting SLAPPs in Federal Court: Erie, the Rules EnablingAct,
and the Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Diversity Actions, 56 B.C. L. REV.

1181, 1187 (2015) (footnote omitted).
402. Id at 1188.
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response, (4) the need to balance competing interests, and (5) the need
for early identification and response mechanisms.
Motives of the Actors: Much like the SLAPP plaintiff who
frivolously weaponizes the legal system to directly intimidate a
perceived political threat, the racially fearful 911 caller frivolously
weaponizes law enforcement to intimidate a perceived safety threat
The SLAPP plaintiff ultimately seeks to force the opponent to back
down from engaging in constitutionally protected activity-freedom of
speech-to enlarge the scope of the plaintiff's power and authority.
Likewise, the racially fearful 911 caller seeks to restrict the alleged
suspect's constitutionally protected freedom of movement to ensure
and reinforce the white dominant role in public places."
The Object and Effect of the Actions: Both SLAPP plaintiffs and
racially biased 911 callers seek to intimidate undesired classes of
people away from public participation and into the shadows. The first
scholars to study SLAPP suits "conservatively estimate that thousands
have been sued into silence, and that more thousands who heard of the
SLAPPs will never again participate freely and confidently in the
public issues and governance of their town, state, or country."
Likewise, thousands of people of color have been unfairly targeted into
compliance and thousands more who hear about the devastating effects
of unwarranted police confrontation withdraw from official
government actors, distrusting any interaction with law enforcement or
other government agents, even when their help is needed."
Moreover, the consequences of each frivolous activity can be
devastating, even lethal. The most successful SLAPP plaintiffs can so
financially cripple their institutional enemies that the corporations
cease to exist. A racially motivated 911 caller can have a similarly
lethal effect on a person's life.
Detection and Response: Similar problems of detection and
response exist in each context as well. One of the primary difficulties
in addressing SLAPP litigation is that plaintiffs do not overtly present
themselves to the court admitting the frivolousness of their case or the

403. See Anderson, supm note 16, at 10-11.
404. PRoNG & CANAN, supra note 28, at xi, 3.
405. See Matthew Desmond & Andrew V. Papachristos, Why Don't You Just Call the
Cops?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30,2016), https-//www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/opinion/why-dontyou-just-call-the-cops.html (describing the chilling effect media attention on police violence
has on communities of color, including refusal to engage law enforcement when needed).
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sinister motivations behind the suit.' One of the primary difficulties
in addressing SLAPP litigation is that plaintiffs typically do not admit
the frivolousness of their case or any sinister motivations behind their
suit Creating anti-SLAPP legislation is therefore incredibly difficult,
as legislators must derive a way to allow the early termination of
SLAPP suits without improperly denying legitimate litigants their day
in court. Likewise, the typical 911 abuser does not usually express their
racial antipathy to the dispatcher or otherwise articulate their
underlying racist motivations in complaining about the lawful conduct
of people of color. Indeed, the nature of pervasive implicit bias is such
that callers themselves may not be consciously aware of the race-based
motives behind the fearful call. Thus, it becomes nearly impossible to
craft a remedy that deters and punishes racist behavior without unfairly
denying or deterring genuine emergency calls.
Competing Interests: The balance between opposing fundamental
interests in the SLAPP and 911 contexts is also instructive. The most
common criticism of anti-SLAPP laws comes from those who believe
there should be no barriers to the right to petition the court for redress.
This right of access to the courts is absolutely fundamental to the
concept of justice in a free and democratic society." The SLAPP
penalty circumscribes this fundamental liberty by providing an early
penalty to claimants who seek judicial redress.
On the other hand, the problem anti-SLAPP legislation seeks to
address also implicates fundamental constitutional freedoms: free
speech and access to courts. Courts and legislatures have recognized
the need to address intimidation-oriented litigation designed for the
sole purpose of curtailing one's fundamental right to speak freely about
matters of public importance." Moreover, the SLAPP suit itself
represents a threat to access to justice, as these frivolous suits clog court
dockets and delay or deny access to legitimate litigants with genuine
needs.
The comparison to frivolous 911 calls is unmistakable. Any
proposed liability for misusing the emergency response system
threatens to deny access to the critical, often life-saving police and
medical apparatuses charged with keeping the citizenry safe. Unlike
406. See Braun,supra note 28, at 973 ('Because SLAPP suits masquerade as legitimate
tort actions, there is no obvious way to identify them from court dockets.").
407. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right ofAccess to Court Under the Petition Clause of the
First Amendment: Dqfining the Right, 60 Omo ST. LJ. 557, 557 (1999).
408. Smith, supra note 27, at 307 (citing cases and anti-SLAPP legislation).
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anti-SLAPP concerns, however, there exists no general constitutional
right to police protection.' While state police forces are charged with
protecting the public and most departments across the country are
required as a matter ofpolicy to respond to all 911 calls, a "fundamental
principle [of American law is] that a government and its agents are
under no general duty to provide public services, such as police
protection, to any particular individual citizen."o
But like frivolous SLAPP suits, frivolous 911 calls both affect
fundamental constitutional guarantees and delay relief to legitimate
911 callers. Marshaling armed law enforcement officers to restrain
individuals engaged in innocent conduct restricts the fundamental
freedom of movement for victims of these calls. In the racially fearful
context, constitutional equal protection becomes a concern when state
actors are involved. Moreover, frivolous 911 calls threaten the safety
of civilians in genuine need of protection because they delay response
to legitimate, time-sensitive calls and thus unfairly and unnecessarily
41
puts citizens at isk. 1
Early Detection and Deterrence: The importance of effective
deterrent mechanisms is evident in both contexts as well. "The
importance of effective anti-SLAPP laws is highlighted by the lack of
protections available through other common law and statutory
solutions to the problem of SLAPPs." 2 While defendants may pursue
sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a
state analog, such sanctions are rarely granted and "do not save a
13
SLAPP defendant from the burden of extensive court proceedings."4
Likewise, targets of racially biased 911 calls theoretically can access
after-the-fact civil remedies, but these avenues for relief do little to
protect them from the risk of degradation, arrest, or violent and
potentially lethal confrontations in the first place.
Thus, as states have enacted legislation to give courts tools to
easily eliminate the threat to SLAPP defendants at the outset of
409. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
410. Id at 3; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
196-97 (1989) (holding that no duty arises from the "special relationship" between police and
civilians, concluding that constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain
individuals, such as incarcerated persons, involuntarily committed mental patients, and others
restrained against their will and unable to protect themselves).
411. See sources cited supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
412. Ernst, supranote 401, at 1186.
413. Id at 1186-87. The same is true for civil countersuits bringing malicious
prosecution or abuse of process claims. These tort remedies may ultimately provide reliet but
only when a defendant has already been forced to litigate a timely and expensive lawsuit. Id
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litigation and not merely through after-the-fact remedies, states should
also enact legislation to reduce or eliminate the threat to targets of racebased 911 calls on the front end. Here, a major difference exists
between a frivolous lawsuit and a frivolous 911 call. Courts lack the
discretion to turn away a frivolous lawsuit at the door. Dispatchers and
officers do-or at least should-have that discretion. Thus, rather than
merely focusing on post-incident punishment for wasting law
enforcement resources, "[p]erhaps the best way to deal with erroneous
calls is for regular officers not to respond."" This focus on preincident deterrence guides the model legislation discussion that
follows.
C.

AnnotatedModel Legislation

Title: This Act shall be called the "911 Abuse Act" (Act).
Definitions: The following terms shall have the following
definitions for purposes of this Act:
*
*
*
*
*

"Dispatcher" shall mean any individual answering a phone call
placed through the 911 or other emergency response system.
"Officer' shall mean any police officer or other law enforcement
personnel.
"Caller" shall mean any individual placing a phone call through
the 911 or other emergency response system.
"Target" shall mean any individual against whom a complaint is
made through a 911 or other emergency response system call.
"Abuse" or "Abusive"" shall mean the misuse of the 911 or
other emergency response system through either (1) making a
false alarm report, (2) reporting false information, (3) reporting
exaggerated information, (4) making a report other than to report
a situation that the person reasonably believes requires prompt
service to preserve human life or property, (5) intentionally
calling and hanging up, (6) intentionally remaining on the line to
unnecessarily prevent Dispatchers from handling other calls, or
(7) intentionally or knowingly making a report for the sole

414. Couper, supra note 259.
415. This statute is narrowly tailored to address intentional 911 abuse calls, not
unintentional 911 misuse calls. See discussionsupra Part IVA.
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purpose of implicating a person or persons in criminal activity on
the basis of their race or ethnicity.4 16
Purpose:The purpose of this Act shall be to deter and minimize
the abusive misuse of 911 and other emergency response call systems,
including but not limited to, abusive misuse of 911 for racially biased
purposes. This Act is not designed to address, deter, minimize, or
punish "unintentional" misuses of 911 and other emergency response
systems, including phantom wireless calls, misdials, and accidental
hang-ups.
Penalty: Any person who abuses the number 911 as defined
herein or otherwise makes a call to 911 for a purpose other than to
report a situation that the person reasonably believes requires prompt
service to preserve human life or property41 commits a misdemeanor
of the first degree, punishable by a fine of no more than $10,000 and a
term of imprisonment not to exceed six months. Any person who is
convicted of a second offense under this Act shall be guilty of a class
three felony, punishable by a fine of no more than $25,000 and a term
of imprisonment not to exceed one year. Any person who is convicted
of a third or subsequent offense under this Act shall be guilty of a class
one felony, punishable by a fine of no more than $50,000 and a term of
imprisonment not to exceed two years.4 18
EnhancedPenaltyforRaciallyMotivatedAbuse: Any person who
abuses the 911 or other emergency response system with the intention
to and for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, causing unwarranted
police contact with, or otherwise targeting an individual on the basis of
that Target's race or ethnicity shall face enhanced penalties as
follows

419

:

416. This definition deters most abusive conduct by not imposing a specific intent
requirement. It also makes a normative statement about the seriousness and difference of
racially motivated abuse by singling it out, while also requiring specific intent for this kind of
conduct. Enhanced penalties for this intentional conduct follow. See infra note 419 and
accompanying text.
417. By borrowing from the precise language in Oregon's 911 abuse statute, the statute
makes clear what constitutes a "nonemergency" and narrowly circumscribes the legitimate
purposes of the 911 system.
418. Imposing penalties for first-time offenders solves the enforcement problems faced
by California and other states that only impose fines for multiple offenses but cannot
meaningfully track multiple instances of misconduct See Takei, supra note 30.
419. The statute makes a normative statement that racially biased 911 abuse is a more
serious and morally blameworthy act that engenders greater harm to the Target and to society
and deserves greater punishment
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(1) First Offense: Class Three Felony, punishable by a fine of no more
than $25,000 and a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year.
(2) Second and All Subsequent Offenses: Class One Felony,
punishable by a fine of no more than $50,000 and a term of
imprisonment not to exceed two years.

'

Dispatcher Discretion: Notwithstanding any conflicting
departmental or administrative policy, Dispatchers shall have
discretion to decline to assign an Officer to respond to a 911 call if the
Dispatcher reasonably believes that the Caller is committing an Abuse
of the 911 system as defined under this Act. The Dispatcher shall, if
required, articulate facts with reasonable specificity indicating why the
Dispatcher believed the Caller was committing an abuse of the 911
system.420
If, in the exercise of this discretion, the Dispatcher reasonably
believes the Caller is abusing the 911 system but decides to assign an
Officer to respond to the. call, the Dispatcher shall describe to the
Officer, with reasonable specificity, the facts and circumstances giving
rise to the Dispatcher's belief that the call amounts to an abuse of the
911 system.4 2
911 CallAbuse Recondeeping- Any Dispatcher who reasonably
believes a Caller is abusing the 911 system shall log the call in the
Statewide 911 Abuse Database (defined herein) and shall record all
reasonably pertinent information, including the identity and phone
number of the Caller, the substance and nature of the call, and the facts
indicating an abuse of the 911 system.
Statewide 911 Abuse Database:The State shall create, fund, and
maintain a statewide, centralized 911 database for the purpose of
collecting and cross-referencing 911 abuse call logs at emergency
response regional centers throughout the State. This database shall be
used for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act and
maintaining statistical data regarding 911 abuse in the State.4 22
420. This discretion is critical to front-end prevention of unwarranted police contact,
something not available to judges in the SLAPP context. The statute also protects against
negligent or bias-motivated Dispatchers by imposing a requirement that Dispatchers articulate
facts to justify why they declined to respond to a particular complaint
421. This provision specifically addresses the situation in Tamir Rice's case, where the
Caller stated the gun was "probably fake" and that Tamir was "probably a juvenile," but the
Dispatcher failed to communicate those statements to the Officers. See Takei, supranote 30.
422. These two provisions address enforcement and recordkeeping problems for
multiple offenses, as demonstrated by California's enforcement problems. See Eastman, supra
note 14.
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Officer Discretion:Officers and their departments are encouraged
to use or authorize the use of discretion when responding to 911 calls
the Officer reasonably believes to constitute an Abuse under this Act,
including without limitation, declining to respond to the call, sending
unarmed law enforcement personnel to respond to the call, or
responding to the call for purposes of investigating the 911 abuse.4
When an Officer becomes aware of facts giving rise to probable cause
of 911 abuse, the Officer shall respond to and investigate the 911
abuse. 4 2 4
Civil Remedies: This Act is not intended to create any new cause
of action under civil law, or to increase or decrease the availability of
any civil remedy otherwise available to a Target concerning any harm
resulting from an abusive 911 call, except as follows:
(1) A conviction for 911 Abuse under this Act shall conclusively
satisfy any causation element under any civil tort.
(2) A conviction for 911 Abuse under this Act shall presumptively
satisfy any harm element under any civil tort, provided that
Officers are dispatched to the call, respond to the call, and make
contact with the Target 425
(3) For purposes of any conviction for 911 Abuse under this Act
qualifying for an "Enhanced Penalty for Racially Motivated
Abuse," a defense of qualified immunity from civil or criminal
liability shall only be available to any Dispatcher who assigns an
Officer to respond to the call, or to an Officer who responds to the
call, if the Dispatcher and/or Officer identifies specific and
articulable facts demonstrating that the Dispatcher and/or Officer
objectively reasonably believed that the call did not constitute an
Abuse under this Act.426
423. This provision recognizes the need to afford officers and departments flexibility to
develop their own policies regarding how to de-escalate responses to frivolous 911 calls. One
may criticize the use of "encourage" in this context, but a state-mandated policy of preventing
any officer discretion in responding to a possibly frivolous 911 call unnecessarily removes
discretion from expert law enforcement agencies. Other provisions herein address the need for
officers to exercise discretion.
424. This provision addresses the under-enforcement of frivolous 911 abuse, requiring
Officers to treat them as seriously as other crimes.
425. This provision recognizes the inherent psychological harm to the Target when
unnecessarily being confronted by a police officer in response to a frivolous criminal
complaint.
426. This provision narrows unduly broad qualified immunity protections by requiring
a clear and articulable statement of why, in the face of a clearly frivolous, racially motivated
911 call, Dispatchers and Officers allowed the weaponization of racial fear anyway.
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VII. CONCLUSION

When white civilians weaponize their racial fears,
[W]hat's really happening is that these [individuals] are looking
into a mirror and seeing a ghost
That ghost is our terrible history of slavery and segregation. It tells
them that something is not right At the deepest level, the callers and
their enablers seem to feel black people do not belong, that [they] should
not be allowed to be as free as whites.427
The ubiquity and permanence of racial fear is necessarily joined
by the ubiquitous and permanent knowledge that people of color are
viewed by police and society in general as more suspicious and
threatening than white individuals. Nearly a century ago, W.E.B.
DuBois stated what was common knowledge then, that "[n]othing in
the world is easier in the United States than to accuse a black man of
crime."428

If we are to acknowledge-as we should-the reality and
permanency of racial fear, we should also impose on all civilians the
assumption of knowledge of this basic fact. In doing so, we necessarily
and quite fairly should require white Americans to consider the
consequences of summoning armed agents of the state to investigate
black Americans, to think twice before making the phone call, and to
assume the consequences of liability for weaponizing racial fear for
frivolous reasons.

427. Patton & Farley, supra note 4 ("This is their vision of America: calling 911, again
and again and again, perpetually policing and controlling black bodies, forever haunted by a
horrific black presence that is in fact nothing more than their own history, their own horror and
their own desire, projected onto black lives.").
428. Elizabeth Hinton, How a Racist Myth Landed Duane Buck on Death Row, LA.
TNs (Oct. 4,2016), http-//www.latimes.com/opiniontop-ed/-oe-hinton-duane-buck-fiturecrime-20161004-snap-story.html.

